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Chief Loophole Officer or Chief Legal Officer: 
Inside Lehman Brothers—A Film Case Study About Corporate 
and Legal Ethics 
Abstract.  This Article discusses the continuing legal education (CLE) visual 
advocacy documentary-style program, which Garrick Apollon (author of this 
Article) researched and developed.  The case study for this CLE documentary-
style program is the film Inside Lehman Brothers—a documentary film by Jennifer 
Deschamps which chronicles the story of the Lehman whistleblowers.  The film 
presents Mathew Lee, former senior vice president overseeing Lehman’s global 
balance sheet; Oliver Budde, former in-house counsel (associate general 
counsel) of the Lehman Brothers; and the racialized female mid-tier manager 
whistleblowers, who all paid a steep price in the 2008 American subprime 
mortgage crisis, while many of the top-positioned white men remained 
unscathed.1  The overall aim of this course, which is pioneered on the ethical
 
1. Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance, Corporate Misconduct, Whistleblowing and Ethical 
Decision Making, UDOCSFILM, [hereinafter Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance] 
https://courses.udocsfilm.com/courses/Inside-Lehman-Brothers [https://perma.cc/C3ZV-4RLY] 
(“Although today the banks have recuperated and are back to business as usual, Inside Lehman Brothers 
is the cautionary tale for how damaging fraudulent behavior can be.  The demise of the giant financial 
global institution Lehman Brothers, a bankruptcy estimated at $639 billion, accelerated the global 
financial crisis and sparked debate in Washington over ethical issues on Wall Street and in other 
financial markets around the world.”).  Garrick Apollon's research for the CLE documentary-style 
program, Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance, Corporate Misconduct, Whistleblowing and Ethical 
Decision Making, began in the context of his fellowship at the Hennick Centre for Business and Law at 
York University.  See Lehman Brothers—Ethics Project, HENNICK CENTRE, https://hennickcentre.ca/ 
researchers/visual-legal-advocacy-program/lehman-brothers-project/ [https://perma.cc/24ND-M7 




lessons we can ascertain from the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, is to prevent 
corporate misconduct and fraud by promoting ethical, personal, and corporate 
standards of behavior for legal and business professionals.  This Article 
concentrates on visual legal advocacy as an instrument to encourage 
professional ethics to legal professionals and law students.  Further, this Article 
argues that legal ethics can be more effectively understood through storytelling 
which illustrates how ethical decision-making can impact someone’s life and, as 
in the case of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and moral failure, how it can 
affect the entire world, just as it did throughout the 2008 global financial crisis.   
Author.  Garrick Apollon is a practicing corporate lawyer of the Law Society 
of Ontario, Canada (2004), a documentary filmmaker, an adjunct professor at 
the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Law, and a part-time professor of 
Corporate Governance and Ethics at the Telfer School of Management.  
Professor Apollon works on the research and production of edutainment 
content accredited for continuing professional education (CPE) and continuing 
legal education (CLE) to provide transformational experiences for legal and 
business professionals. 
Garrick Apollon earned his J.D. from the University of Ottawa; LL.B. 
(Civil Law) from l’Université Laval; LL.M. (Master of International Business 
Law) from l’Université Laval, and LL.CM. (Master of Comparative Law) 
from the University of Pennsylvania Law School (Penn Law), where he 
studied visual legal advocacy and law-genre documentary filmmaking with 
Professor Regina Austin, director of the Penn Program on Documentaries & 
the Law.  Professor Apollon would like to note that the views expressed in this 
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I.    THE USE OF VISUAL LEGAL ADVOCACY AND AN EDUTAINMENT 
LAW-GENRE DOCUMENTARY FILM LIKE INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS 
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERDISCIPLINARY CONTINUING 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) COURSES 
Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance, Corporate Misconduct, 
Whistleblowing, and Ethical Decision Making,2 a continuing legal education 
(CLE) visual advocacy documentary-style program based upon the 
documentary film Inside Lehman Brothers by Jennifer Deschamps, is a 
powerful educational tool because it “provide[s] viewers with better role 
models to relate to, often at a personal and emotional level, than through 
information alone.”3  Research shows effective ethics and compliance is not 
merely a rational activity, but behavioral as well, aiming to change the minds 
and hearts of people.4  Corporate governance and ethics should not be 
practiced as a legal exercise for compliance within the black letters of the 
law, but instead as a behavioral exercise which aims to instill a corporate 
culture of collective and individual ethical decision-making within the whole 
organization, from senior management and middle management to all 
employees, for the betterment of society.5  Therefore, a documentary-style 
case study is the perfect educational tool to achieve superior results in 
corporate fraud prevention and ethics.   
Visual legal advocacy is “effectively evaluating and making arguments 
through videos and images.”6  To further understand this novel concept, it 
is appropriate to disentangle it word by word.  First, the word “visual” 
reflects how we are visual creatures in a visual society.7  And while some 
 
2. Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance, supra note 1. 
3. Global Program for Entertainment Education: Background and Context, WORLD BANK, 
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01542/WEB/0__C-106.HTM [https://perma.cc/P7HM-
K4JC].  The educational benefits of films are further explored in Garrick Apollon’s article entitled 
COLLARED—A Film Case Study About Insider Trading and Ethics.  Garrick Apollon, COLLARED—A 
Film Case Study About Insider Trading and Ethics, 11 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 2, 6 (2020). 
4. Apollon, supra note 3, at 10–11 (citing Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs 
Fail—and How to Fix Them, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/why-
compliance-programs-fail [https://perma.cc/858Q-NAVW]).  
5. See Chen & Soltes, supra note 4 (asserting corporate compliance and ethics should be 
practiced as a behavioral exercise in order to have a real impact). 
6. Visual Law Project, Yale Law School, About Visual Law Project, YALE L. SCH. [hereinafter 
Visual Law Project] https://law.yale.edu/isp/initiatives/about-visual-law-project [https://perma.cc/ 
WLZ4-8RAU].  This definition of visual legal advocacy and the necessity of visual legal advocacy to a 
lawyer’s education is further explored in Collared.  See Apollon, supra note 3, at 7–10 (defining visual 
legal advocacy and evaluating its potential use in the educating of professionals).  
7. It is no wonder that we use the phrase, “A picture is worth a thousand words.” 
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may contend that we have always been a visual society,8 technology and 
social media, particularly the emergence of applications like Instagram or 
TikTok, have made this emphasis on the visual all the more essential.9  
There was a time when lawyers were trained solely in written and oral 
advocacy, but it now appears, for the reasons mentioned previously, that 
speaking with images such as videos and documentaries for visual advocacy 
is the most effective method of communication to grasp the public’s 
attention.10  This shift is revolutionary.  The continued development of and 
reliance on technology and media puts a newfound emphasis on interactive 
programming that will become vital to ensuring the positive outcome of a 
trial or social development of the law.11  In the future, lawyers will have to 
plead not only with (what will soon be recognized as antiquated) words and 
writings, but with visuals such as images, videos, and documentaries 
circulatable on social media platforms, like YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, 
and Instagram.  The next generation of litigators and legal educators ought 
to be innovative and rely on visual advocacy, more than traditional written 
and oral advocacy methods, to achieve victory in their cases.12   
Second, the word “legal” makes visual advocacy specific to our legal 
experience as members of a society governed by the rule of law.13  Lawyers 
are, above all, communicators.  But communicators need more than written 
 
8. See Becky Little, What Prehistoric Cave Paintings Reveal About Early Human Life, HISTORY, 
(Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/prehistoric-cave-paintings-early-humans [https:// 
perma.cc/P72G-C5KR] (“Images painted, drawn or carved onto rocks and cave walls . . . reflect one 
of humans’ earliest forms of [visual] communication . . . .”).  
9. See Visual Law Project, supra note 6 (asserting advancing technology has made visual advocacy 
a “vital part of our legal education”); Apollon, supra note 3, at 7–10 (“[I]n today’s world marked by 
technology, the Internet, and social media, lawyers need also be trained in the art of visual legal 
advocacy.”). 
10. See Apollon, supra note 3, at 7–10 (explaining the shift from an emphasis on oral and written 
advocacy to visual advocacy).  This shift was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 global pandemic, 
which saw an increased demand for visual educational content.  This increased demand further 
transformed the role of technology in education.  Id. at 6 n.6.  
11. See Katja Martin, A picture is worth a thousand words, 29 MED. WRITING 28, 28–29 (2020) 
(describing how technological advancements have made the visual approach to communication vital 
to the works understanding, reception, and success).  
12. See Regina Austin, The Next “New Wave”: Law-Genre Documentaries, Lawyering in Support of the 
Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 809, 812 
(2006) (asserting the importance of visual legal advocacy for the future of legal education and the legal 
profession). 
13. Lynn Mather, Law and Society, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 681 (Keith 
E. Whittington et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2008) (“The study of law and society rests on the 
belief that legal rules and decisions must be understood in context. Law is not autonomous, standing 
outside of the social world, but is deeply embedded within society.”). 
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words—now more than ever.  Disputes in our society are resolved and 
guided by rights-based, power-based, and interest-based approaches.14  
However, the world in which lawyers practice today seems to necessitate 
using a wide array of sensory tools geared to persuade, clarify, entertain, and 
enthrall.15 
Third, the word “advocacy” is defined as “public support that somebody 
gives to an idea, a course of action or a belief,” or as “support, advice and 
help given to people, often with special needs or aims, who are unable to 
speak for themselves.”16  Hence, my argument is that visual legal advocacy, 
in comparison to written and oral advocacy, is a more effective method of 
persuasion in terms of social psychology.17  This is why courts are reluctant 
to permit the use of edited videos (e.g., video settlement documentaries) that 
could amount to the presentation of a documentary film by a litigant to a 
judge or jury.18  Considering the definition of advocacy, a legal advocate can 
garner the support of the jury or public and give their client a more effective 
voice with legal arguments presented through videos and images.   
Consider the role of biases in the legal realm.19  It is well-known that one 
(prominent) way biases are constructed is through media, such as television 
shows and films.20  I argue that to deconstruct the unjust and unfair social 
 
14. See Garrick Apollon, MMA Negotiation, 15 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 3, 15 (2013) 
(detailing the three core approaches on which negotiation and dispute resolution are founded). 
15. Visual Law Project, supra note 6 (“Visual and digital technologies have transformed the 
practice of law.  Lawyers are using videos to present evidence, closing arguments, and victim-impact 
statements; advocates are making viral videos to advance public education campaigns; and scholars are 
debating ideas in a multimedia blogosphere.”).  
16. Advocacy, OXFORD LEARNER’S DICTIONARIES, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries. 
com/definition/english/advocacy [https://perma.cc/3PEV-LXQ9].  
17. See Apollon, supra note 3, at 9 (“Visual legal advocacy is not only an art but also a behavioral 
science founded on social psychology and the science of persuasion.”). 
18. See Austin, supra note 12, at 851–53 (discussing the challenges of using a video, such as a 
video settlement documentary, in the courtroom).  
19. Biases, such as racism or sexism, are based on false perceptions, simplifications, or 
prejudicial value judgments, and can be learned and unlearned.   
20. See generally Adam J. Schiffer, Teaching Media Bias: The Case of the Trump Presidency, 17 J. POL. 
SCI. EDUC. 1, 1–18 (2021) (providing a template for teaching about media bias, using the case of 
President Trump and his administration).  See also Peter Beattie, Theory, Media, and Democracy for Realists, 
30 CRITICAL REV. 1, 1 (2018) (suggesting documentaries are a great source of critical self-reflection to 
explore new points of view and can help to mitigate biases); HARRY M. BENSHOFF & SEAN GRIFFIN, 
AMERICA ON FILM: REPRESENTING RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY AT THE MOVIES 3 
(Wiley-Blackwell 3d ed. 2021) (“It is a basic principle of this work that by studying American film 
history, we can gain keen insights into the ways that different groups of American people have been 
treated (and continue to be treated.”).  In discussing how various types of people are represented in 
American cinema, Benshoff and Griffin offer the example of: 
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biases based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic class 
depicted in Inside Lehman Brothers, a legal advocate will essentially need to 
fight fire with fire by torching the biases through the use of visual legal 
advocacy.  For instance, the original Netflix documentary series Trial by 
Media examines the outcomes of famous court cases from the 1980s–2000s, 
which are believed to have been dramatically affected by extensive (and 
ultimately damning) media coverage.21  However, I am not a proponent of 
the amorality theory for lawyering and advocacy.22  Instead, I strongly 
contend lawyers are responsible for what they do when representing their 
clients.23   
Visual legal advocacy is still a novel and experimental approach within the 
legal profession, but it is arguably the future of the law considering the 
overall importance of visual advocacy in a digital society.24  Inside Lehman 
Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance is a visual legal advocacy documentary 
because it is a “true” and “real” story of “law as lived experience.”25  Law 
 
[A] film about both a white man and a Native American man.  The story alternates between the 
two characters, showing their daily activities: getting up, eating, interacting with their family and 
friends, working, and then going to sleep.  There would seem to be nothing necessarily biased or 
prejudiced according to this description of the film’s content.  Yet, in this hypothetical film, all 
the scenes with the white man are brightly lit, with the camera placed at eye‐level; the shots are 
of medium length, and calm, pleasant music is used for underscoring.  In contrast, all the scenes 
of the Native American man are composed with dark shadows, with the camera constantly tilted 
at weird angles; the shots are quick and choppy, and dark, brooding music is used for 
underscoring.  Such choices obviously slant how a viewer is supposed to react to these two 
characters.  The content of the film may have seemed neutral, but when the other axes of film 
form are analyzed, one realizes that the white man was presented in a favorable (or neutral) light, 
while the Native American man was made to seem shifty or dangerous.  
Id.  
21. See TRIAL BY MEDIA (Netflix 2020) (showcasing infamous trials in which media presence 
may have impacted the trajectory of the case due to public exposure).  
22. See César Arjona, Amorality explained. Analysing the Reasons that Explain the Standard Conception 
of Legal Ethics, 4 RAMON LLULL J. OF APPLIED ETHICS 51, 53 (2013) (“[T]he amorality theory claims 
that by being morally neutral the lawyer achieves moral righteousness.”).  
23. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 650 (2016) 
(discussing the importance of professionalism and ethics in the legal profession).  For instance, the 
historic hostility for attorneys and the legal profession goes back to the 14th century in England.  As 
evidence, we find Shakespeare’s character saying, “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”  
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, act 4, sc. 2, l. 65.  This history is all the more reason to act with 
care and restraint in the performance of professional duties by lawyers.   
24. See Apollon, supra note 3, at 8 (highlighting the efforts of educational institutions and 
professors to incorporate visual legal advocacy, though it is not yet an institutionalized practice). 
25. Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance, supra note 1; see Austin, supra note 12, at 815 
(characterizing stories in which law is a central theme as “law as a lived experience”). 
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as “lived experience,” in the context of visual legal advocacy, is the 
storytelling of a person such as a plaintiff or a defendant in civil cases or a 
victim, defendant, or prosecutor in criminal cases.26  This storytelling is a 
representation of the lived legal experiences and choices of a given person 
in a trial or legal debate, as well as the knowledge that one acquired from 
these experiences and choices.27  Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in 
Compliance is an advocacy documentary because of its interest in influencing 
decision-makers and regulating Wall Street and financial markets worldwide 
in various areas of society such as legal, political, and economic 
institutions.28   
Visual legal advocacy needs to be a vital part of our legal education to 
make the law more accessible and less boring.29  Stop and take a minute to 
think about who society considers to be a great trial lawyer.  Does a jury 
react more to a monotone and rational trial lawyer, or a passionate and 
entertaining one?30  Consider the depiction of attorneys in Hollywood legal 
drama films and television shows.  Has Atticus Finch been admired for 
decades as the ideal lawyer because he was lackluster and apathetic?  Quite 
the opposite, the dramatization and passion depicted in the character of 
Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird has had a lasting impact on what it 
means to be a model lawyer.31 
Postman’s assertion that our culture has been “transformed into congenial 
adjuncts of show business” might be true; however, research conducted on 
edutainment by the World Bank’s 2015 World Development Report, Mind, 
Society and Behavior, does not conclude, as Postman did, that we are at risk of 
 
26. See Austin, supra note 12, at 862 (assessing the strength of video settlement documentaries 
to address the aspects of a case in which legal argumentation and storytelling overlap). 
27. See id. at 815 (discussing the core characteristics which truly set nonfiction films apart from 
narrative or fictional works about law).  
28. Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance, supra note 1.  
29. Stanford Law School has characterized visual advocacy as a way “to make law less boring.”  
See Visual Advocacy: How to Make Law Less Boring, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/event/visual-
advocacy [https://perma.cc/YTJ9-73WL] (advertising an event about the power of visual advocacy). 
30. See James R. Elkins, Reading/Teaching Lawyer Films, 28 VT. L. REV. 813, 859–60 (2004) 
(“The lawyers’ failure that we see in lawyer films is an inevitable truth, a truth both entertaining and 
educational.”).  
31. Scholar Alice Petry remarked that “Atticus has become something of a folk hero in legal 
circles and is treated almost as if he were an actual person.”  See The Significance of Atticus Finch in 
The Legal World, RMN AGENCY (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.thermnagency.com/the-significance-of-
atticus-finch-in-the-legal-world/ [https://perma.cc/YH2M-MB25]; see also Elkins, supra note 30, at 864 
(noting how Hollywood legal drama films and television shows have a blurring effect on the 
conventional lines between the “serious” and the “entertaining” aspects of our society). 
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“amusing ourselves to death.”  Rather, the World Bank asserts (with 
cautionary principles): “[E]ntertainment education or the purposeful use of 
mass media entertainment may” have a positive impact on social change and 
can “be an effective tool to change norms and behaviors.”  The World Bank 
went so far as to assert: “There is an unprecedented opportunity to use 
entertainment media to change the lives of billions of people, especially in 
urban areas.  Entertainment education or edutainment thus, can be a game-
changer for development.”32 
The importance of an ethics education has been discussed for decades, as 
the public appears to continually be disgusted by the greed of Wall Street 
and the modern capitalist world.33  However, the public often forgets that 
the problem is not simply the pathological pursuit of profit, but the human 
behaviors among corporate players—competition and vanity—that result 
from this compulsive societal framework.  Research on ethics education 
argues that this subject is multidisciplinary and cannot be taught in a 
classroom, as it is a multifaceted and multilateral process which must be 
ongoing for the rest of our lives.  Further, it is not only an intellectual 
process, but also an emotional process.34  This is why, as an expert in 
forensic psychology discussed in my first film Collared, people with 
sociopathic traits, such as emotional manipulation, are often sought after 
and successful in the business world.35   
 The process of ethics education should include the ability to inspire the 
minds and hearts of the actors in our society and to provide them with the 
moral frameworks and practical tools to assess ethical risks and, above all, 
evaluate the consequences of their actions and decisions.36  Conventional 
wisdom teaches us that the basic principle of ethical behavior is based on a 
 
32. Apollon, supra note 3, at 15 (footnotes omitted). 
33. See John Paul Rollert, Greed Is Good: A 300-Year History of a Dangerous Idea, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/greed-is-good-a-300-year-
history-of-a-dangerous-idea/360265/ [https://perma.cc/NKL3-Y3TY] (“Greed has always been the 
hobgoblin of capitalism, the mischief it makes a canker on the faith of capitalists.”).  
34. See Charlene Foley Deno & Lisa Flynn, Ethical Standards for Accounting Students: A Classroom 
Exercise on Internal Controls, 7 J. BUS. & EDUC. LEADERSHIP 4, 4–11 (2018) (discussing the process of 
ethics education).  
35. Collared/Documentary on Insider Trading, The Hennick Ctr. For Bus. & L., 
https://hennickcentre.ca/researchers/visual-legal-advocacy-program/documentary/ [https://perma. 
cc/M2TR-RG52]. 
36. See generally Apollon, supra note 3 (advocating for the use of visual legal advocacy to better 
equip lawyers to make ethical decisions in personal and professional situations). 
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guideline that is used in situations to balance right and wrong.37  And yes, 
ethics is about right and wrong, but this dual concern theory can also lead 
to an oversimplification of ethics in action in our real world.  In an effort to 
avoid this oversimplified understanding—that ethics are black and white—
documentary case studies provide viewers with a profound reflectional and 
sensorial human experience, allowing them to consider the “grey area” of 
ethics.  To that end, Inside Lehman Brothers provides a transformational 
experience to the viewers as it is an exciting way to increase awareness, 
widen ethical decision-making umbrellas, and dissect the consequences of 
the intersection of law and ethics on people and society.   
In sum, visual legal advocacy is activity used by visual legal advocates to 
influence decision-making within legal, political, economic, and social 
institutions.  Therefore, the success of visual legal advocates largely rests on 
captivating the attention of others.38  Let me ask you these questions: If 
your jury or the public does not take notice of your legal arguments, how 
will you successfully advocate for the interests of your client or cause?  If 
the jury or public does not listen to you, how can you lead your 
argumentation effectively?  And if you cannot capture the attention of your 
jury or public, how will your client’s interest or cause of action survive?  With 
these questions in mind, the question then becomes, how are we going to 
go about captivating such attention?  I argue edutainment (with cautionary 
principles) is one important source of social change because lawyers, with 
the ability to implement such techniques, play key roles as public advocates, 
legal educators, and drivers of access to justice.  The film Inside Lehman 
Brothers is the perfect illustration of such legal awareness.39  As the film 
promotes the transmission of legal consciousness, it helps us analyze the 
larger political-institutional structure of Wall Street that has shaped its legal-
institutional nature.  In addition, the film invites us to critically examine the 
capitalist institutions which impact our daily lives in order to elevate our 
social consciousness, a prerequisite component of positive social change.40   
 
37. See id. at 37 (equating virtue ethics and doing the right thing). 
38. See generally Ben Parr, 7 Ways to Capture Someone’s Attention, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 3, 2015), 
https://hbr.org/2015/03/7-ways-to-capture-someones-attention [https://perma.cc/KR6B-5N86] 
(listing research-based methods to capture people’s attention). 
39. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS (Ina Fichman, Frederick Lacroix 2018) [hereinafter INSIDE 
LEHMAN BROTHERS]. 
40. See generally Elena A. Pevtsova et al., Ensuring Human Rights and the Development of Legal 
Awareness of Juvenile Offenders in Closed Institutions, 11 INT’L. J. ENV’T & SCI. EDUC. 10435, 10435–10444 
(2016) (discussing how to grow legal awareness in our society).  
  
12 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 12:2 
II.    WHAT IS YOUR INITIAL REACTION AFTER WATCHING THE FILM? 
“I agree we need some help-but the BROs always wins!!” 41   
—Dick Fuld, former CEO of Lehman Brothers 
First, let me start with a short synopsis of the film: Inside Lehman Brothers 
chronicles the stories of Lehman’s whistleblowers.42  The whistleblowers 
here—Mathew Lee, former senior vice president overseeing Lehman’s 
global accounting and balance sheet; Oliver Budde, former in-house counsel 
of Lehman; and the predominantly female mid-tier managers—all suffered 
dire consequences in the 2008 American subprime mortgage calamity.43  
Banks, on the other hand, have been bailed out with taxpayer money and 
are back to conducting business as usual.44  Inside Lehman Brothers provides 
a cautionary tale of how damaging fraudulent behavior in the banking world 
effects not only the banking world, but the entire global world.45  Today, 
Inside Lehman Brothers provides a captivating story in “what not to do” in 
American business history—with multiple studies and analyses offering 
various determinations for its demise.46  But for those individuals directly 
effected, the “little men,” who do not have the luxury of sitting around and 
wondering what should have been done differently, they are still reeling from 
the effects of the crisis and subsequent recession, “as their home values, 
their jobs, their retirement savings, and their beliefs in the integrity of the 
financial markets [have] yet to be restored.”47  And adding insult to injury, 
the current global recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and its 
 
41. Julia La Roche, 20 Infamous Quotes That Wall Street Wishes Were Never Made Public, BUS. 
INSIDER (Aug. 10,2012, 8:42 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/infamous-wall-street-quotes-
2012-8#the-bros-always-wins-1 [https://perma.cc/CM9B-YD86]. 
42. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39.  
43. Id.  Though not surprisingly, “[m]any of the top-positioned men [survived] untouched.”  Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. (“The demise of the giant financial global institution Lehman Brothers, a bankruptcy 
estimated at $639 billion, accelerated the global financial crisis and sparked debate in Washington over 
ethical issues on Wall Street and in other financial markets around the world.”). 
46. See Joseph L. Zales, $22 Trillion Lost, Zero Wall Street Executives Jailed: Prosecutors Should Utilize 
Whistleblowers to Establish Criminal Intent, 6 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L COMP. L. 167, 167 (2016) (discussing 
the 2008 financial crisis which was caused by excessive risk-taking on Wall Street).  
47. Id. at 168–69. 
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associated government public health policies, will make it virtually 
impossible for many to recover.48 
I researched and published a visual legal advocacy online course entitled 
Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance offered in a documentary-
style format.49  Overall, the course is founded on the ethical lessons we can 
realize from the world’s largest bankruptcy and one of the major causes of 
the 2008 global financial crisis.50   
To start this Article on a strong note, I would like to ask my readership 
for its initial reaction after watching the documentary film Inside Lehman 
Brothers.  This request will hopefully pique curiosity and encourage those 
who have not had the opportunity to view it to give it a watch.  Until I get 
some feedback from my readership, I will share with you my initial reaction.  
The film’s director, Jennifer Deschamps, brilliantly constructed the ideal 
documentary case study which demonstrates, to legal and business 
professionals, aspiring professionals (university students), and also the 
public at large (what old common law arrogantly refers as “the layperson”), 
the negative human consequences of corporate greed and vanity on our 
society.51  Inside Lehman Brothers explores the moral bravery of 
whistleblowers who attempted to lessen the disastrous consequences of the 
2008 global financial crisis52—a crisis that has cost the world trillions of 
dollars.53  However, it is an abstract concept, and we must talk about the 
catastrophic human consequences—the millions of jobs, homes, lives, and 
retirement savings lost.   
I often talk about the importance of social psychology and organizational 
behavior to change the pathological culture of Wall Street and its leaders.  
Sharing this same impression, internationally-respected organizational 
 
48. See Martin McKee & David Stuckler, If the World Fails to Protect the Economy, COVID-19 Will 
Damage Health Not Just Now But Also in the Future, 26 NATURE MED. 640, 641 (explaining the importance 
of bold economic action to save off the most devastating effects of the pandemic).  
49. See Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance, supra note 1 (advertising a course on 
business ethics and risk management in the financial sector). 
50. Id.  “The overall objective of this course is the promotion of professionalism” and ethics by 
encouraging “the personal and corporate standards of behavior expected by legal and business 
professionals to prevent corporate misconduct and fraud.”  See id. 
51. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
52. Id. 
53. See John Cassidy, The Real Cost of the 2008 Financial Crisis, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/the-real-cost-of-the-2008-financial-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/4U8N-8PMJ] (“[T]he Fed provided close to five trillion dollars in liquidity and loan 
guarantees to large non-American banks.  It also provided roughly ten trillion dollars to foreign central 
banks through currency swaps.”).  
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behavior scholar Henry Mintzberg,54 in summarizing the global financial 
crisis, states, “[W]hat we call a financial crisis is really at its core a crisis of 
management, and not just a crisis of management, but a crisis of 
management culture. . . .  In other words, what you had is a detachment of 
people who know the business from people who are running the business.”55  
Thus, in a period in which management is touted over and over again as a 
critical variable in defining the success or failure of organizations, it becomes 
all the more important to look at the other side of the leadership coin—how 
leaders create culture and how culture defines and creates leaders. 
In regard to fraudulent mortgage and lending practices, these same 
financial institutions were approving loans to nearly anyone and with little 
regard to their creditworthiness.  As a result, many of the individual 
consumers obtaining these loans were “subprime” borrowers, who were, 
unsurprisingly, unable to repay their debt upon maturity.56  Such subprime 
loans were then pooled consciously with loans of somewhat higher quality 
to disguise their risk.57  Thus, fraud and financial misrepresentations, in 
addition to greed and moral lapses that are not necessarily illegal, were 
clearly rampant on Wall Street in the run-up to the 2008 global financial 
crisis. 
It has been suggested that “[h]igh levels of segregation create a natural 
market for subprime lending and cause riskier mortgages and thus 
foreclosures to accumulate disproportionately in minority neighborhoods 
 
54. In addition to his work in organizational behavior, Henry Mintzberg completed his master’s 
degree in Management and PhD from the MIT Sloan School of Management.  He currently runs two 
programs at the Desautels Faculty of Management of McGill University which have been designed to 
teach his alternative approach to management and strategic planning.  Henry Mintzberg, MCGILL, 
https://www.mcgill.ca/desautels/henry-mintzberg [https://perma.cc/9GGY-YCKA]. 
55. MBA: Mostly Bloody Awful, Background Briefing with Stephen Crittenden, AUSTL. BROAD. 
CORP. (Mar. 29, 2009), https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/mba-
mostly-bloody-awful/3143174 [https://perma.cc/A9V8-RUS7] (emphasis added).  
56. See Elizabeth Gravier, The average credit score of a subprime borrower is 578—here’s how much income 
and debt they have, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/select/breakdown-of-a-subprime-
borrower/ [https://perma.cc/54R7-Q8NB] (“Experian’s most recent data from Q1 2020 shows that 
subprime borrowers have an average 578 FICO credit score.  On the FICO credit score scale ranging 
between 300 on the low end to 850 on the high end, a 578 falls under ‘very poor.”).  
57. “These pooled loans then were securitized into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), asset 
backed securities (ABS), mortgage backed securities (MBS), and credit default swaps (CDS) by creative 
financial engineers at the investment banks.  These highly complex derivative products were blessed 
by self-interested rating agencies, too sophisticated for the majority of industry regulators to fully 
comprehend, and marketed and sold to less than sophisticated buyers with less than sufficient 
disclosures.”  Zales, supra note 46, at 170 (footnote omitted).   
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within racially segregated metropolitan areas.”58  Thus, in my opinion, the 
subprime loans can be analogized to a predatory Ponzi mortgage scheme 
that targets and aims to dispossess underprivileged and mainly racialized 
Americans, such as African-Americans and Hispanics.59  Economic racism, 
as such, is often misunderstood and minimized, but the documentary shows 
that the quest for economic justice remains in America.   
The documentary demonstrates Wall Street financiers’ reckless risk-
taking, fraudulent mortgage and lending practices, and perversions around 
increasingly complex financial products.60  As noted by Anton Valukas in 
the documentary, experts hired experts to try to understand the complex 
financial products structured by Lehman Brothers.61  One of the key 
hallmarks of a pyramid scheme, as defined by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Office of Investor Education and 
Advocacy, is a “[c]omplex commission structure.”62  Due to the sheer 
complexity of such structure, the SEC goes further by educating investors 
to “[b]e concerned unless commissions are based on products or services 
that you or your recruits sell to people outside the program.  If you do not 
understand how you will be compensated, be cautious.”63  This concern 
arose as “[e]xcessive risk-taking was all too prevalent on Wall Street in the 
decade or so leading up to the Financial Crisis.”64  It must further be noted 
that “[i]t was during this time that sophisticated Wall Street financiers 
claimed to have ‘banish[ed] risk,’ when, in fact, they had simply lost track of 
it” in their pathological pursuit of profit.65   
 
58. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 
75 AM. SOCIOL REV. 629, 630 (2010). 
59. See id. at 638 (arguing the crisis was based on the extortion of wealth from the working 
classes and racial minorities (African Americans and Hispanics), which led to economic discrimination). 
60. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
61. See A Postmortem on Lehman Brothers: Oh, Brother, ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2010), 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2010/03/12/oh-brother [https://perma.cc/ 
D552-XMRS] [Hereinafter A Postmortem on Lehman Brothers] (explaining how “Mr[.] Valukas and his 
team took more than a year to research their report” in which “[t]hey collected more than 5m 
documents and reviewed an estimated 34m pages of information”). 
62. Beware of Pyramid Schemes Posing as Multi-Level Marketing Programs, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts-ia_pyra 
midhtm.html [https://perma.cc/8227-XCYL]. 
63. Id. 
64. See Zales, supra note 46, at 169 (“Investment banks on Wall Street were leveraged upwards 
of 30-to-1 pre-Crisis, meaning they were executing their often risky trading strategies with borrowed 
money.  Indeed, these leverage ratios had ratcheted upwards from 2004 to 2008, skyrocketing from 
about 12-to-1 to 33-to-1, respectively.”).  
65. Id. at 169 n.11. 
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Anton Valukas is a key subject matter expert in the documentary and the 
author of the considerable “forensic accounting flavored” legal report 
examining the causes of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.66  His most 
important discovery, which aids in better understanding this case, is the off-
balance-sheet accounting gimmick orchestrated by Lehman and the fact that 
experts hired experts in an effort to understand it.67  Consequently, Inside 
Lehman Brothers provides a depressing view of how a “culture of greed, zero 
accountability, and risk-taking”68 has infiltrated the core of Wall Street, 
ultimately resulting in the perfect storm: the collapse of taxpayer-funded 
government bailouts and the largest bankruptcy in the world’s history.69  
The film leaves us wondering whether it was only the pathological corporate 
culture at Lehman Brothers or all the firms on Wall Street that burned the 
world economy, and the “little people” along with it?   
Overall, my initial reaction—albeit from an emotional point of view (that 
lives were wrecked, some beyond repair)—is that this film case study offers 
viewers a complete sensorial and reflectional human experience on the 
“overlooked” American story of corporate greed and untrustworthiness.  
Ironically, the global financial crisis was rooted in trust for sovereign bodies.  
“In God We Trust”—the official motto of the United States70—was always 
more than just a religious statement.  Pull out your wallet and take a look at 
the inscription present on every U.S. dollar: “it’s an affirmation that its 
allegedly democratic financial system is better than everything else out 
 
66. See A Postmortem on Lehman Brothers, supra note 61 (noting how the “nine-volume, 2,200-page 
report . . . published on Thursday March 11th, has a table of contents that lasts for 38 pages”).   
67. See John Carney, Report: Lehman Brothers Used “Accounting Gimmick” To Hide The Size Of Its 
Balance Sheet, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 11, 2010), https://www.businessinsider.com/report-lehman-
brothers-used-accounting-gimmick-to-hide-the-size-of-its-balance-sheet-2010-3 [https://perma.cc/ 
PCE6-6WLT] (“Lehman used what Valukas describes as an ‘accounting gimmick’ to make it appear as 
if it had off-loaded risky assets and reduced its balance sheet.”).  The gimmick, known inside the walls 
of Lehman as “Repo 105,” gave way to a transaction in which “Lehman would raise cash by selling 
assets with a promise to buy them back later. . . .  And because it was really a financing rather than a 
sale, the assets remained on Lehman's balance sheet.”  Id.  But, in actuality, Lehman would handle the 
transaction as if it were a legitimate sale and remove the risky assets from its books.  Id.  
68. See Zales, supra note 46, at 179 (discussing the flagrant corporate culture of perpetual greed 
and risk on Wall Street commonly overlooked by federal regulators and prosecutors).   
69. The 2008 global financial crisis “eventually led to a four-year global ‘Great Recession’ and 
resulted in sovereign debt crises for many nations, including Greece.”  Id. at 168.  
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there.”71  But is it actually though?  Clearly not, as 2008 changed how we 
regard the guardians of the financial order.72  Arguably, the “God” 
referenced in “In God We Trust” may not be what we traditionally think of 
as the God of Christianity or Islam.  In most religions, God is more of a 
metaphor to what is fair and just, and all men are equal.73  But that is not 
the case in the global financial order, where inequality among banks and 
corporations and their respective clients runs rampant.74  Thus, it is 
apparently not in “God” or in “equality” we trust, but in “corporate higher-
up’s”—the Goliath’s—that we trust (or thought we could trust).  Thus, 
viewing the crisis through the eyes of the Biblical tale of David and 
Goliath75—as represented by the brave whistleblowers who tried to stand 
up against Lehman Brothers—we are able to consider in whom we actually 
trust. 
III.    THE FILM DISCUSSES THE STORY OF CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWERS 
AND THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR MORAL BRAVERY. 
WHAT IS THIS FILM TEACHING US ABOUT WHISTLEBLOWING 
IN PRACTICE?   
Inside Lehman Brothers reveals the story of what happened to those who 
suspected the collapse was coming, tried to warn the world, and ultimately 
were unsuccessful.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the legal definition 
for “whistleblower” is an employee who reports “illegal or wrongful 
activities of his employer or fellow employees.”76  The SEC defines an 
“eligible whistleblower” as “a person who voluntarily provides the SEC with 
original information about a possible violation of the federal securities laws 
 
71. Alexander, The Price of Trusting “God”, MEDIUM (Dec. 24, 2019), https://medium.com/ 
coinmonks/the-price-of-trusting-god-71f126467c82 [https://perma.cc/4XEY-WWL4].  
72. Id.  
73. Id.  
74. See id. (highlighting corporate and financial inequality by showing that “banks and 
corporations are offered money at much cheaper rates than to ordinary people”). 
75. Three thousand years ago on a battlefield in ancient Palestine, a shepherd boy defeated a 
mighty warrior with nothing more than a stone and a sling.  David and Goliath Bible Story 
Study Guide, LEARN RELIGION, https://www.learnreligions.com/david-and-goliath-700211 
[https://perma.cc/3BSB-NV86].  See Alyson Shontell, There’s a Convincing Theory That Goliath, Not David, 
Was Actually The Underdog, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 17, 2014, 2:06 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/malcolm-gladwell-goliath-was-the-underdog-not-david-2014-6 
[https://perma.cc/2B26-9X4A] (suggesting “David and Goliath is ‘a metaphor for improbable 
victories,’ [Malcolm] Gladwell explained. . . ‘Why do we call David an underdog?  Well, we call him an 
underdog because he’s a kid, a little kid, and Goliath is this big, strong giant.’”) 
76. Whistleblower, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1913 (11th ed. 2019).  
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that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.  The information 
provided must lead to a successful SEC action resulting in an order of 
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million.”77  Essentially, whistleblowers are 
to white-collar crime what informants or “snitches” are to the world of blue-
collar crime.  One of the most important differences is that the vast majority 
of whistleblowers are not criminals, but rather people of high moral 
character who are exasperated by the immoral and illegal actions of their 
employers and decide to act on the basis of their ethical leadership.78  
Conversely, informants in the blue-collar crime world are often criminals 
who wish to negotiate protection or a lighter sentence with the authorities 
in exchange for information about their “employer.”79   
The documentary focuses on whistleblower Matthew Lee, who in 2007 
was working as a senior accounting executive at Lehman Brothers, and 
raised the alarm when he noticed some terrifying number-crunching going 
on.80  Lehman Brothers then swiftly fired Lee, and while there was no direct 
evidence that Lee was fired because of his memo, the circumstances were 
certainly suspicious, leading Lee to believe that Walls Street had blacklisted 
him.81  The documentary is compelling in recounting the personal stories 
of people like Lee and other whistleblowers who have encountered a 
difficult path since ratting out their employer.  Specifically, Lee expressed 
he had been crushed by his industry and found himself seeking justice that 
he realized he probably would never get.82  So, he sold his house, decided 
“to hell with everyone else’’ and now travels around Australia on his 
motorbike.83  Thus, in a world where it’s often easier to keep one’s head 
below the parapet and live a comfortable life, the film exemplified how 
much willpower it takes to stand up to those with money and power.  One 
 
77. Office of the Whistleblower, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/frequently-asked-questions#faq-2 [https://perma.cc/M38A-Y7 
NA]. 
78. Doug Casey, Doug Casey on the Difference Between a Whistleblower and a Rat, INTERNATIONAL 
MAN, https://internationalman.com/articles/doug-casey-on-the-difference-between-a-whistleblower 
-and-a-rat/ [https://perma.cc/2VTB-TY49] (“A whistleblower is a good thing only when he exposes 
government corruption.  The government is a special case, because it is by nature a coercive 
organization.  It’s intrinsically dangerous and needs to be kept under control any way possible. In this 
context, a whistleblower is a well-intentioned snitch.  A lot like an assassin would normally be a bad 
thing—but when his objective is a nasty dictator, he’s transformed into a good thing.”).  
79. Id.  
80. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
81. Id. 
82. Id.  
83. Id. 
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situation the documentary fails to explain is why the recipients of a letter 
from a senior vice president detailing the potentially dodgy accounting did 
not act.  This failure to act is left as both a suggestive and rhetorical question 
for the viewers.  Lehman’s C-Suite executives put those letters in the back 
of a drawer, knowing that even if they suffered consequences, when it was 
all over, they would still probably be financially secure—well off, even.84  
When it is no longer possible to do wrong and stay rich, the Lehman story 
will lose its luster.  But not today.   
The documentary also presents the story of Oliver Budde, a former in-
house counsel (associate general counsel) with Lehman Brothers who 
appears to be both a good guy and a moral lawyer.85  Oliver Budde refused 
to play the role of “Chief Loophole Officer” through a technical 
interpretation of the law of the rules and, instead, decided to become a 
whistleblower.86  His story of moral bravery goes against all the negative 
stereotypes of corporate lawyers.   
During his time with the bank, Budde noticed Lehman was failing to disclose 
the sizable unvested stock options it previously granted to its Chairman and 
CEO, Dick Fuld, as part of his compensation package.  Despite Budde’s 
internal protests, the brass at Lehman Brothers refused to disclose the grants 
in their annual filings and chose instead to rely on a small legal loophole that 
arguably allowed them to skirt the disclosure requirements of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  Not wanting to become complicit in Lehman’s 
scheme, Budde resigned from the investment bank in 2005.  A few years later, 
however, the SEC closed the disclosure loophole Lehman Brothers had been 
exploiting. . . .  When Budde opened the March 2008 proxy Lehman Brothers 
filed with the SEC, he was appalled to see the investment bank was still hiding 
Dick Fuld’s stock options, to the tune of $264 million.  Budde decided that 
he had seen enough; it was time to the blow the whistle on his former 
employer.  He contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission five times 
between April and September of 2008 (the month Lehman collapsed), 
outlining Lehman’s scheme of nondisclosure, naming names, and providing 
the calculated amounts of Fuld’s hidden compensation.  Lehman’s house of 
cards came crashing down in September of 2008.  As of May 2014, Oliver 
Budde still had not heard from anyone at the SEC about his allegations.  The 
conscious decision not to disclose such clearly material information to 
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federal securities laws, including § 302 of SOX . . . .  If the SEC listened to 
Budde, they would have had a much easier time assessing the mens rea, or 
willful intent, of these bad actors, so as to exercise their discretion in deciding 
whether to make a criminal referral to DOJ.  Indeed, had Oliver Budde’s 
whistleblowing been heard and acted upon, [federal] prosecutors may have 
been able to criminally prosecute the Lehman Brothers’s executives 
responsible for failing to make such disclosures.87   
The SEC, conceptualized as the “Wall Street Police” by Oliver Budde, 
chose to ignore his credible statement, rendering futile his lawyer conceived 
warning of stock option-reporting shenanigans before bankruptcy 
ensued.88  Budde’s moral courage is thus analogous to the role of lawyers 
as gatekeepers of integrity.  That said, he now runs his own law firm that 
specializes in representing corporate whistleblowers like himself.  His life 
experience certainly makes him the ideal lawyer to represent his clients with 
both a compassionate and strategic perspective.   
Director Jennifer Deschamps offers a contrast to those whistleblowers 
she speaks to from the New York investment bank’s upper ranks—white 
men who were ignored or fired—and the lower-ranking ones who reported 
fraud in the mortgage subsidiaries of Lehman Brothers—black and Latina 
women who claim to have faced direct forms of intimidation and even 
sexual harassment.89  This is not subtle, but it works.  Inside Lehman Brothers 
reminds us that the ever-present intersection of race, gender, and social 
status comes to play even for whistleblowers.  The documentary begins on 
a powerful note by showing the dichotomous situation of Sylvia Vega-
Sutfin, former account executive (2004–2005) in a subsidiary of Lehman 
Brothers which offered subprime mortgage loans with higher interest rates 
to those who had trouble maintaining a repayment schedule.90  Sylvia, like 
many others, saw early warning signs of the dangers of subprime mortgages 
and tried to ring the alarm.91  Instead of being heard, she was subjected to 
harassment when she attempted to expose the bank’s corrupt lending 
practices.92  Today, Sylvia Vega-Sutfin still lives in fear of her former 
employer—so much fear that she lives in her house in the forest with a gun 
 
87. Zales, supra note 46, at 183–84 (footnotes omitted).  
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and practices martial arts.93  The director presents her duality of living in 
fear while also displaying the strength and defiance that explain her decision 
to become a whistleblower.94  This powerful illustration (hopefully) allows 
viewers to come to an understanding of the traumatic shock most 
whistleblowers must confront, while at the same time leaving the door open 
to our imagination and conspiracy theories—is Lehman an evil corporation 
that operates as a criminal organization ready to kill “snitches”?  Sylvia 
mentions in the documentary that she first naively believed that her “job 
was to help people to fulfill the American dream.  To have a home where a 
family can be happy.  Kids can lounge on the couch, being able to have 
outrageous birthday parties.  That’s the American dream for me.”95  What 
seems to have hurt her the most is the stark realization that she played a role 
in destroying the American dream.   
The documentary also presents the likable Linda Weekes, an African 
American woman and former underwriter at BNC Mortgage in Sacramento, 
a Lehman’s subsidiary, as one of its main players.96  She explains how she 
foolishly believed herself to be a custodian of corporate integrity by stating, 
“I always consider myself like an FBI agent because I think it is my job to 
make sure, number one, that the information that they have indicated in 
their documentation, I’ve verified that that is accurate.”97  Of course her 
initial naiveté quickly turned to the disheartening realization that Lehman 
was in fact a corrupted organization.   
 After Linda discovered fraud in a number of files from brokers, she 
contacted Sylvia and requested an urgent meeting; in the documentary Sylvia 
referred to the brokers as her clients.98  When Sylvia reviewed one of the 
files, she discovered a gentleman, who claimed he worked at Kentucky Fried 
Chicken (which he did), was listed as earning $7,000 per week in his 
mortgage application.99  Sylvia tried to take some action, but she quickly 
learned the corporation perpetuated this culture of fraud:  
And so I went back, went to that mortgage company as a courtesy, to let them 
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someone in our office had contacted them, and said, all you need to do is 
change the broker.  I thought, you know, I’m not going to allow this to 
happen, because this man clearly knows he’s come there committing fraud.  
And he thinks he can just put paint over the top and get pre-approved and be 
doing the same thing.  So at that time, I got an email sent to me that was not 
supposed to come to me.  And what the email said is that we need to keep 
this company going because I have all these loans that need to fund.  And so, 
this was a corporate approval of them committing fraud.  I realized that the 
entire corporation was corrupt.  And they don’t want me to know about it.100   
Sylvia’s video testimony is one of the most crucial in the documentary 
because she explains the specific fraudulent mortgage and lending practices 
of these financial institutions in approving loans to nearly anyone with little 
regard to their creditworthiness and how this ultimately caused the financial 
system to fall like a house of cards.101   
The documentary goes on to show the women whistleblowers discussing 
the alleged abuse and harassment they have suffered at the hands of their 
employers.102  The women employees filed a suit against the company, and, 
in the documentary, their lawyer explained “[t]hey have a claim for wrongful 
termination.  It’s based upon the fact that they were whistleblowers, that 
they were protected by law because they were complaining about illegal 
behavior in the workplace.”103  Their claims are for $27 million, and their 
lawyer believes “[t]hey’re worth every dime of that because these women’s 
lives have been ruined by this.  And how much money is it worth to have 
your life ruined? To stand up for what you believe in and what’s right?”104  
The question is: will justice be served?  The documentary casts doubt since 
Lehman is now gone and bankrupted.105  But Lehman, as we know, was 
 
100. Id. 
101. See Zales, supra note 46, at 169–70 (explaining the fraudulent mortgage and lending 
practices that led to the 2008 global financial crisis).  
102. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
103. Id. (interviewing Gary Gwilliam, attorney for at least some of the women featured in the 
documentary). 
104. Id. 
105. One technical detail the documentary fails to explain is whether Lehman Brothers, as a 
parent company, can be held liable for all the actions of its subsidiaries.  My answer is influenced by 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), imposing direct or indirect liability on parent companies 
for their subsidiaries’ actions resulting in a violation.  See A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 27 (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z23-E62K] (explaining principles of corporate 
liability for anti-bribery violations as a parent company’s direct liability or its liability under agency 
principles, for bribes its subsidiary paid). 
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not alone in its corruption, as “Bank of America lied about billions in 
bonuses[ ]” and “Goldman Sachs failed to tell clients how it put together 
the born-to-lose toxic mortgage deals it was selling.”106  Yet not one of 
them has faced time behind bars.107   
In response to the rampant corruption plaguing the financial industry, 
and specifically, the disastrous effects from the 2008 financial crisis, 
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank,” “Dodd-Frank Act,” or “the Act”) on 
July 21, 2010.108  The main objectives of the Act’s enactment were to 
identify and respond to the causes of the 2008 financial crisis and “to 
promote ‘the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to fail,” to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices.’”109  Dodd-Frank’s key strategic goal is to 
encourage whistleblowers to report securities law violations to facilitate 
investigations and prosecutions.110  In an effort to entice potential 
whistleblowers, the law “directs that the Commission pay awards . . . to 
whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the Commission with original 
information about a violation of the securities laws that leads to the 
successful enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative action.”111  
 
106. Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONES (Feb. 16, 2011), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-179414/ [https:// 
perma.cc/K56A-69P5]. 
107. Id. (“Not a single executive who ran the companies that cooked up and cashed in on the 
phony financial boom—an industrywide scam that involved the mass sale of mismarked, fraudulent 
mortgage-backed securities—has ever been convicted.”).  
108. Keith Goodwin, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
FED. RSRV. HIST. (July 21, 2010), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/dodd-frank-act 
[https://perma.cc/6QDN-LQGG]. 
109. Ian A. Engoron, Note, A Novel Approach to Defining “Whistleblower” in Dodd-Frank, 
23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 267 (2017) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)). 
110. See Zales, supra note 46, at 180–82 (asserting whistleblowing is a key solution, but that the 
regulatory and prosecutorial framework is insufficient).  
111. See Whistleblower Program Rules, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 23, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2020/34-89963.pdf [https://perma.cc/R34Y-CQDN] (“Original 
information provided by whistleblowers has led to enforcement actions in which the Commission has 
obtained more than $2.5 billion in financial remedies, including more than $1.4 billion in disgorgement 
of ill-gotten gains and interest, of which almost $750 million has been or is scheduled to be returned 
to harmed investors.”).  
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These monetary incentives and other protections,112 the Act claims, will 
encourage employees to report violations and protect employees who come 
forward and break the vow of silence in the workplace.113  Despite 
monetary incentives and other protections, the documentary shows that 
relying on whistleblowers is not a realistic solution—prosecutors need more 
independence and more regulatory tools.  One such tool, *ISO 37002, 
which emerged in July of 2021, offers the new standard for whistleblower 
management systems.114  It aims to provide guidance for implementing, 
managing, evaluating, maintaining, and improving robust and effective 
whistleblower management systems.115  While the standard is still in its 
infancy, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) hopes that 
by issuing in a global standard in this space, it will pave the way for how 
organizations can run effective whistleblower programs.116  After all, a 
global standard makes it more accepted and uniform.  
While much of the blame of the financial crisis, thus far, has focused on 
bank and corporate management, lawyers—individuals seemingly 
championed for their morality—also played a pivotal role in the economic 
calamity.  In turning to the role of lawyers, the documentary discusses the 
independence of federal prosecutors through the concept of a “revolving 
 
112. See id. (offering the protection of anonymity with rule 21F-7, the Commission states it will not 
disclose information that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of the whistleblower, 
except under certain circumstances); Dan Mangan, SEC Whistleblower Payouts Top $1 Billion Total as 
Securities Watchdog Announces Near-Record Award, CNBC (Sept. 15, 2021, 5:04 PM), https://www.cnbc. 
com/2021/09/15/sec-whistleblower-payouts-top-1-billion-financial-regulator-says.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4JHQ-JG2S] (“The SEC by law does not disclose the identity of whistleblowers or 
information that could lead to revealing their identity.”).  
113. See generally Whistleblower Program Rules, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 23, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2020/34-89963.pdf [https://perma.cc/R34Y-CQDN] (discussing 
the protections the Act employs to “continue to encourage individuals to come forward”).  
114. ISO 37002:2021(en): Whistleblowing Management Systems—Guidelines, ISO, https://www.iso. 
org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:37002:ed-1:v1:en [https://perma.cc/W5R3-TYQ3]. 
115. See id. (offering support and protection to whistleblowers and other interested parties 
involved, ensuring that reports of wrongdoing are dealt with in a proper and timely manner, and 
improving organizational culture and governance).  This Article explains the importance of 
whistleblowers (who are moral heroes), but reiterates the importance of an effective whistleblower 
management program for an organization to support whistleblowers by complying with ISO 37002 
standards.   
116. See id. (“This document provides guidance to organizations for establishing, implementing, 
maintaining and improving a whistleblowing management system . . . .”) 
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door.”117  Oliver Budde adequately summarizes the “revolving door” issue 
as one source of lack of accountability on Wall Street:  
The top people at the SEC or at the Department of Justice, well they were 
making millions of dollars, defending Wall Street banks are working inside of 
Wall Street banks before they became the so-called police.  Okay.  Why on 
earth would we expect them to go against their friends?  And they almost 
always then go back and work for wall street when they are done.  Within the 
beginning of 2009, Obama was elected and so he brought in his new people 
at the SEC.  You have a director, the boss, the top boss, the CEO of the SEC, 
if you will.  And then there is something called the director of enforcement.  
And so he’s in charge of doing the investigations.  The guy that they put in 
was a lawyer from Deutsche Bank, and Deutsche Bank is one of the biggest 
banks involved in the crisis.  Okay.  And furthermore, Deutsche Bank is one 
of the banks that was most involved with Lehman Brothers.  And then we 
expect him as the director of enforcement at the SEC to now go and 
investigate Repo 105.  This is never going to happen.  Never gonna 
happen.118   
Budde is essentially explaining how in American politics, the “revolving 
door” is a movement of personnel between roles as legislators and 
regulators, on one hand, and members of the industries affected by the 
legislation and regulation, on the other.119  This tool has long been regarded 
an advantageous instrument of regulatory capture.  “[I]n order to secure a 
post-government position in the private sector, the theory goes, regulators 
must bend the rules to curry favor with their prospective employers.”120  
 
117. See Kevin L. Young et al., Beyond the Revolving Door: Advocacy Behavior and Social Distance to 
Financial Regulators, 19 BUS. AND POL. 327, 333 (2017) (asserting on basis of data analysis that the 
financial system’s independence is closely tied to regulatory agencies).  But see Wentong Zheng, 
The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1265 (2015) (“A growing body of empirical 
literature, however, either finds no conclusive evidence of a capture effect or finds evidence of an 
opposite effect that the revolving door indeed results in more aggressive, not less aggressive, regulatory 
actions.  To account for these incongruous results, scholars have formulated and tested a new ‘human-
capital’ theory positing that revolving-door regulators have incentives to be more aggressive toward 
the regulated industry as a way of signaling their qualifications to prospective industry employers.”).  
118. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
119. See Zheng, supra note 117, at 1266 (footnote omitted) (“Since the beginning of 
President Obama’s second term, several high-level government officials have walked through the 
proverbial door in both directions.  Mary Jo White, a litigator who spent the last decade defending 
Wall Street banks and executives at the law firm Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, was confirmed as the 
new chairwoman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).”).  
120. Id. at 1267 (footnote omitted). 
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The undertaking though, has had a profound impact on the law, so much 
so that special structures have been put in place to mitigate its effects.121  
Among the most enduring of concerns is the “risk of regulators being 
captured by industry interests.”122  Thus, as we can see, such conflicts of 
interest are not just apparent (perceived) for the public, but they also amount 
to real (actual) and future (potential) conflicts for federal prosecutors.123  
The documentary therefore clarifies that legislative reforms are needed to 
deal with conflicts of interest for federal prosecutors in order to close the 
revolving door.124   
An additional cause of the financial crisis of 2008 is this idea of systematic 
inequality in the United States—that different rules apply to different 
players.  America was premised on the idea that “all men are created equal” 
with the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,”125 yet the idea 
that every American has an equal opportunity to move up in life is mere 
fiction.  There is no longer an “American dream” with the trickle down of 
prosperity from the rich to all social classes, nor social mobility.  The rich 
are getting richer, and the poor are getting poorer.  The pain is omnipresent 
and has risen from the struggles of American workers on Main Street to the 
biggest companies on Wall Street.  The United States is undergoing an 
existential crisis that is causing even the dirty word “socialism” to start 
ringing in many Americans’ ears.126   
In addition to legislative regulation, one way to combat this vast inequality 
is through whistleblowers within a particular institution or sector who can 
assist with investigations and prosecutions.  Specifically, they can assist in 
 
121. Id.  
122. Id. (footnote omitted) (“Discussions of regulatory capture and its impact on the regulatory 
process permeate scholarly literatures in law, political science, and economics.”).  
123. See Cecilia Wang, Stop That Revolving Door: Analysis of the Appropriate Application of the Cooling-
off Period beyond Senior Government Employees, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 297, 297 (2017) 
(“[A] period of one or two years in which a former public sector employee is prohibited from 
representing matters involving or appearing before his former agency of employment—exists as a 
means of regulating immediate departures from public to private sector law enforcement.”).  
124. See INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39 (“Why on earth would we expect [top 
officials at the SEC] to go against their friends [associated with financial institutions]?”). 
125. David Kamp, Rethinking the American Dream, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 5, 2009), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2009/04/american-dream200904 [https://perma.cc/3XRN-
M2ZX]. 
126. See Gary Younge, Socialism Used to Be a Dirty Word. Is America Now Ready to Embrace It?, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/06/socialism-used-to-
be-a-dirty-word-is-america-now-ready-to-embrace-the-ideology [https://perma.cc/Q6Q4-46DG] 
(providing poll numbers regarding rising popularity of socialism in America). 
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establishing evidence of actus reus (the objective element of the alleged 
financial crime or misconduct) and especially mens rea—mental element of a 
person’s intention to commit a crime, or knowledge that one’s action, 
omission, or willful blindness would result in a crime).127  The fact that 
nobody was prosecuted for their hand in the 2008 financial crisis “is 
‘consistent with what many people were worried about during the crisis, that 
different rules would be applied to different players.  It goes to the whole 
perception that Wall Street was taken care of, and Main Street was not.’”128  
Whistleblowers will not come forward if they know there is a limited chance 
that alleged wrongdoers will be prosecuted and brought to justice.  If we 
translate this to blue-collar crime, informants will not be willing to go up 
against drug dealers or dangerous criminals if they know the crime will not 
be prosecuted; the risk to the informant, should justice take a back seat, 
appears to be much steeper than the reward.129   
Financial incentives have proven effective in motivating whistleblowers 
to detect and report fraud to the relevant authorities.130  In a recent study, 
researchers at the University of Toronto found the presence of “a strong 
monetary incentive to blow the whistle does motivate people with 
information to come forward.”131  However, one strong argument against 
financial incentives is that this could create a climate of terror where 
employees wait for the moment to turn against their employers.  One author 
even suggests this will create an infestation of “rats” on Wall Street and 
financial markets.132  I argue this assertion is false and biased.  Research 
shows that contrary to popular belief, most whistleblowers are loyal to their 
organization’s compliance officers and internal compliance programs before 
 
127. Zales, supra note 46, at 179. 
128. Id. (citing Gretchen Morgenson & Louis Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top 
Figures, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute. 
html [https://perma.cc/VY3W-WTWR]). 
129. It is common sense to think in terms of blue-collar crime when we discuss white-collar 
crime.   
130. See supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text. 
131. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J, OF FIN. 2213, 2215 
(2010). 
132. See Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of 
Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting”, 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 491–92 (2012) (describing the historical view 
of whistleblowers as rats and its impact on whistleblower policies including incentives).  For instance, 
consider how American federal legislators saw reward programs for whistleblowers as both a “Snitch 
Program” and the “Reward for Rats Program.”  Id. at 491. 
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going to the federal authorities.133  In practice, as featured in the 
documentary, most whistleblowers report internally according to internal 
procedures before filing a formal complaint with the federal government.134  
This demonstrates their corporate loyalty, because internal reporting from 
whistleblowers is not always required, nor taken.135  Yet, some government 
officials believe the reward amounts currently available to prospective 
whistleblowers may not be enough to induce current Wall Streeters to take 
the risk of blowing the whistle, especially given the influence of institutional 
allegiance and the financial costs of speaking out.  Nonetheless, 
whistleblowing is seen as one of the most effective ways of detecting fraud, 
which, in the process, bridges the inequality gap.  In the healthcare industry, 
for example, more than forty percent of fraud detection occurs because of 
tips from whistleblowing employees.136  Thus, the role of whistleblowing 
in fraud detection should not be underestimated.   
One of the main reasons whistleblowing has been so successful in 
exposing instances of fraud is that whistleblowers are often insiders with 
access to information not otherwise available to prosecutors.  
Whistleblowers often possess the cutting-edge technical knowledge and 
know-how that authorities do not possess, which allows them to better 
identify potential fraud and other violations much earlier than would 
otherwise be possible.  For example, it is publicly known that federal 
authorities often use reformed hackers to investigate cybercrimes because 
hackers’ special knowledge is often not possessed by law enforcement.  
Similarly, in the financial fraud context, these insiders often have legal, 
financial, and accounting training and acumen that allows them to 
comprehend, synthesize, and evaluate information that directly, or 
indirectly, points to fraud.137  This financial and legal know-how allows 
 
133. See Claire Sylvia & Emily Stabile, Rethinking Compliance: The Role of Whistleblowers, 84 UNIV. 
CIN. L. REV. 451, 456 (2016) (providing data on whistleblowers loyalty to employers through the use 
of internal reporting first). 
134. See id. at 451 (“Research shows that most whistleblowers report fraud internally first, 
typically turning to external sources only when internal compliance has failed.  That whistleblowers do 
report internally should not be surprising given the pull of institutional loyalty and the extraordinary 
personal and financial costs of speaking out.”).  
135. See id. at 454 (noting how the Dodd-Frank Act does not contain a provision requiring 
whistleblowers to report violations internally prior to submitting violations to the Government). 
136. Dyck et al., supra note 131, at 2215.  
137. See Zales, supra note 46, at 179 (arguing that working extensively with whistleblowers can 
help establish mens rea through their unique knowledge and experience). 
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whistleblowers within financial institutions to decipher between criminally 
fraudulent transactions and overly complex, yet, lawful ones. 
So why, in the case of the 2008 financial crisis, were the whistleblowers 
that came forward not effective? And how, given the $22 trillion cost of the 
financial crisis to the global economy, did (basically) the entirety of Wall 
Street go unpunished?138  I argue, more effective use of whistleblowers—
many of whom are lawyers, accountants, or market participants with 
significant financial acumen—might have significantly changed this result.  
The often-cited rationale for the enforcement response by regulators and 
prosecutors to the global financial crisis is that it is just too difficult to prove 
Wall Street executives acted with the requisite criminal mens rea in violating 
the federal securities laws.139  As such, I argue whistleblowers can step in 
and play the necessary role of keeping any organization honest, and 
especially add value when blowing the whistle on wrongdoing committed 
by governmental organizations.  Furthermore, creating financial incentives 
for federal government employees to become whistleblowers could greatly 
increase the instances of whistleblowing.  Finally, whistleblowing also sees 
great value in the public sector—after all, paying substantial monetary 
awards to whistleblowers not only compensates whistleblowers for 
reputational damages, but it also incentivizes whistleblowing.  Thus, both 
the private and public sectors understand and appreciate the value of 
whistleblowers. 
As discussed previously, my examination of this documentary as a 
filmmaker receives its inspiration by the well-known Biblical parable of 
David and Goliath.  The film Inside Lehman Brothers illustrates that capitalism 
is a sacrosanct value in America by discussing how the motto “In God We 
Trust” was historically placed on American dollars largely because of the 
increased Christian religious sentiment of the republic.140  The idea was to 
create a beautiful divine dollar, “to which no possible citizen could 
object.”141  This banknote illustrates today’s American core Judeo-Christian 
ethics of “God, Liberty, Law.”142  Therefore, my reference to David and 
 
138. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
139. See Zales, supra note 46, at 173–75 (suggesting risk adverse federal prosecutors “were no 
longer attracted to the idea of prosecuting white-collar crimes if evidence as to the defendant’s 
intentions—their mens rea—was seemingly lacking up front”). 
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Goliath has both a religious and secular meaning to identify the film’s main 
argument and purpose.   
First, the religious meaning is key.  My law and MBA students often forget 
business ethics is largely influenced by religion.143  However, empirical 
research shows religiosity is not a conclusive predictor of ethical awareness 
among business professionals.144  The film cleverly recovers “religion’s 
prophetic voice for business ethics.”145  Can we argue that modern western 
business ethics neglects the ethical virtuosity of its religious traditions?  Or 
that western business ethics revolves around exploitation, colonization, and 
genocide, as asserted in the tough, provocative, and well-researched HBO 
documentary series Exterminate All the Brutes.146  The series’ director, 
Raoul Peck suggests: “It’s not knowledge we lack.  What is missing is the 
courage to understand what we know and to draw conclusions.”147  This 
statement advocates that ethics education has little impact if it is not 
combined with an intrinsic desire to act to change our policies and laws.148  
For instance, consider the capitalistic business world the American economy 
is premised in.  For a long time, it would seem, Americans took comfort in 
the fact that their version of capitalism was not only the most dynamic and 
productive economic system in the world, but it lifted billions of people out 
of poverty and offered more hope to the hopeless than any other economic 
system.  In reality, this broad and all-encompassing idealization of 
 
143. See Richard T. De George, Theological Ethics and Business Ethics, 5 J. BUS. ETHICS 
421, 426–27 (1986) (discussing the contribution of religion and theologians to business ethics and 
suggesting that there does not appear to be a separate field of theological business ethics antithetical 
to the philosophical approach).  
144. But see Justin G. Longenecker et al., Religious Intensity, Evangelical Christianity, and Business 
Ethics: An Empirical Study, 55 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 378 (2004) (“[T]his study provides evidence of a 
significant religious factor in business ethical decision-making.”). 
145. Cf. Martin Calkins, Recovering Religion’s Prophetic Voice for Business Ethics, 23 J BUS. ETHICS 
339, 348 (2000) (“To see itself as just an applied philosophy or social science overly narrows business 
ethics and that to rectify this problem . . . business ethics ought to reclaim unabashedly it religious 
traditions.”). 
146. Richard Brody, “Exterminate All the Brutes,” Reviewed: A Vast, Agonizing History of White 
Supremacy, NEW YORKER (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/the-front-row/ 
exterminate-all-the-brutes-reviewed-a-vast-agonizing-history-of-white-supremacy [https://perma.cc/ 
6AP9-G7EQ]. 
147. Id.  
148. See Charles Fombrun & Christopher Foss, Business Ethics: Corporate Responses to Scandal, 
7 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 284, 284 (2004) (explaining how ethical leadership in corporations must 
be established by the combination of “(1) the infusion of ethical principles in corporate cultures, (2) the 
appointment of ‘Chief Ethics Officers’, and (3) the adoption of strict ethical guidelines and codes of 
conduct”). 
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“capitalism” has been whittled down year by year to favor only a small 
oligarchy, the rich.  This is particularly relevant in the U.S. housing scheme, 
and even more so for minorities.  As shown in the film, black Americans 
received loans without due diligence and verification.149  Further, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) concluded that black Americans 
were predatorily targeted by banks before the crisis.150  Thus, a big part of 
the reason that the recession hit black Americans so hard was that it gutted 
home values and home ownership is a much more significant part of the 
group’s overall wealth.  And while the 2008 financial crisis was hard on all 
Americans, the African American community, who were already the most 
economically and financially vulnerable segment of the population, is still 
suffering the consequences from the collapse.151  This means the racial 
wealth gap “slant” that existed before the crisis is even greater today.152  In 
that regard, Inside Lehman Brothers offers a surprisingly personal look, through 
a strong human and spiritual experience, at how one company orchestrated 
its own demise and left millions of Americans homeless through sheer, 
unchecked greed.   
The story of David versus Goliath is imagery commonly used to describe 
the nature of battle between underdogs and their giant competitors.  Thus, 
it is particularly relevant and can assist us in understanding the players in the 
Lehman Brothers catastrophe.  In the documentary, Goliath—the 
behemoth “champion” of the Philistines—is former CEO of Lehman 
Brothers, Dick Fuld, and David—the young shepherd—is the brave 
 
149. Loans with precarious and unfavorable terms relate to the subprime lending rush which 
preceded the housing crisis.  See Christopher J. Curfman & John Kandrac, The costs and benefits of liquidity 
regulations: Lessons from an idle monetary policy tool, 41 FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 1, 
8 (2019) (“The exceptionally high default rates of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages may be due in 
part to the relatively poor risk attributes of these loans.”). 
150. Sam Thielman, Black Americans unfairly targeted by banks before housing crisis, says ACLU, 
GUARDIAN (June 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/23/black-americans-
housing-crisis-sub-prime-loan [https://perma.cc/LBG3-RYA2]. 
151. Vincent Adejumo, African Americans’ economic setbacks from the Great Recession are ongoing—and 
could be repeated, CONVERSATION (Feb. 5, 2019, 6:40 AM), https://theconversation.com/african-
americans-economic-setbacks-from-the-great-recession-are-ongoing-and-could-be-repeated-109612 
[https://perma.cc/ED3F-8E3Z].  
152. See Gillian B. White, The Recession’s Racial Slant, ATLANTIC (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/black-recession-housing-race/396725/ 
[https://perma.cc/2JN7-4WQ5] (“[A] report from the ACLU says that black families will continue to 
suffer the effects of this disproportionately for decades to come: By 2031, white household wealth will 
be 31 percent below what it would’ve been had the recession never happened . . . .  For black 
households, wealth will be 40 percent lower, which will leave black families about $98,000 poorer than 
if the recession hadn’t taken place.”).  
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whistleblowers trying to defeat this giant corporation.  Thus, Fuld emerges 
as the chief villain in the film.  Despite his role, Fuld never suffered serious 
harm as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.  Conversely, the whistleblowers 
are presented as the savior.  They acted as selfless martyrs at the expense of 
their careers.  Therefore, while Fuld, the “Gorilla of Wall Street,” won the 
legal battle (he did lose a fortune, but seems to be doing just fine), he lost 
the moral battle.  The reverse is of course true of whistleblowers; they are 
the legal losers but the spiritual and moral winners of the battle.  This idea 
is further emphasized when Matthew Lee mentions that he sleeps at peace 
knowing he did the right thing,153 while Dick Fuld’s greed and opulence is 
exposed by his hundreds of millions of dollars in bank accounts and 
mansions.154  The film skillfully shows this dichotomy.  While Wall Street 
villains, such as Dick Fuld, may possess riches in terms of vanity and 
materiality, whistleblowers are rich in their ethical decision-making, having 
saved their souls from the greed of Wall Street.155  After all, the Bible states: 
“[w]hoever oppresses the poor to increase his own wealth, or gives to the 
rich, will only come to poverty.”156  This Bible verse supposes that the story 
of “David and Goliath” means a prolonged struggle of good versus evil; it 
is not a single battle but instead a long and continuing one.  In that regard, 
the film gives hope that there will always be people willing to stand up 
against tyrannical corporate power.   
Second, the secular meaning of my analogy is that David’s victory over 
Goliath was strategical and not by chance.  David’s approach of hitting 
Goliath with a stone from a sling was a brilliant plan of attack to target the 
giant’s weakness.157  Comparatively, the film is a reflective exercise to study 
how whistleblowers, as custodians of integrity, could win and hold 
accountable giant corporations, such as Lehman Brothers, for their 
corporate misconduct and fraud.  As a former collegiate football player, 
sports analogies can be helpful when referring to the dominating 
 
153. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39 (demonstrating the modesty and financial 
struggles of some whistleblowers).  
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Proverbs 22:16 (ESV), BIBLEGATEWAY, https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search 
=Proverbs+22%3A16&version=ESV [https://perma.cc/T4VJ-YM7W]. 
157. Was David vs. Goliath Duel a Miracle or Just Hormones?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 17, 2000), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2000-02-17-0002180240-story.html (stating 
“Goliath, who the Old Testament indicates was about 10 feet tall, suffered from a pituitary gland 
disease called acromegaly” which leads to a person growing extremely tall—but also often leads to 
double-vision and severe nearsightedness).  
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corporation and the individual, seemingly weaker, whistleblower.  The 
mental strength and strategic mindset of the underdog, typically the lesser 
team, against a giant corporation, typically the favored team, is what can lead 
to a victory.  Malcolm Gladwell discusses this idea in his TEDTalk entitled 
“The Unheard Story of David and Goliath.”158  Inside Lehman Brothers, he 
suggests, exposes that while whistleblowers are the spiritual and moral 
victors, they are rarely the real winners in our material world.159  Today, 
they are still injured and struggling with the consequences of their decision 
to battle Goliath.160  In this sense, the film exposes the regulatory 
weaknesses of our capitalist system and ineffectiveness of corporate 
whistleblowing to prevent global financial crises.161  As such, this film is 
the perfect visual case study to reflect on the regulatory reforms necessary 
to empower whistleblowers as the underdogs and custodians of corporate 
integrity.   
IV.    THE FILM DEPICTS RICHARD SEVERIN FULD JR.— 
AMERICAN BANKER BEST KNOWN AS THE FINAL CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF LEHMAN BROTHERS UNTIL 2008—AS A VILLAIN 
IN THIS STORY.  WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THIS FILM DEPICTION? 
“Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be 
damned, and no body to be kicked?” 162 
—Edward, First Baron Thurlow, 1731–1806 
Can we say that Dick Fuld, a “one percent[er],” is the villain of the story?  
Or is he merely the product of an ill and not properly regulated system that 
allows American corporations to become weapons for the interests of a 
 
158. Malcolm Gladwell, The unheard story of David and Goliath, YOUTUBE (Sept. 30, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ziGD7vQOwl8&list=LLTwCdX-oXqpglE3CJcanQ1g&index 
=773 [https://perma.cc/F6FB-TM7S]. 
159. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
160. Wall Street- Lehman Brothers—A Whistleblowers Nightmare, INSIDER EXCLUSIVE, 
https://insiderexclusive.com/wall-street-lehman-brothers-a-whistleblowers-nightmare/ [https:// 
perma.cc/VAH2-MC9L] (explaining how “[e]ach of them was told to look the other way, and then 
was subjected to retaliation and harassment that was designed to force them to quit[,]” and 
“[e]ventually, each of them was forced to leave their employment.”).  
161. Id.  
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small financial elite?163  Like Baron Thurlow questioned in the 18th century, 
when we gave life to corporations and gave them the legal status of a person, 
“did [we] ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no 
soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?”164  Corporations are not 
people.  Yet, they have been given such a status.165  The first principle of 
corporate law and governance is that for-profit corporations are legal 
entities with their own legal interests and identities, separate and distinct 
from those of their shareholders.166  Thus, the very purpose of the 
corporation as a legal form is to create a separate legal entity, “distinct in its 
legal interests and existence from those who contribute capital to it,” with 
limited liability in the service of maximizing shareholder profit and value.167  
As such, I argue that the cure for this is more corporate personhood which 
can ultimately lead to more democracy within corporations.168  This 
increased personhood will have two facets: 1) more personal accountability 
for the directors and senior officers of the corporations—personal liability 
for officials and “directing minds,” such as Dick Fuld, when such individuals 
have so much authority in the corporation that the person can be considered 
the “alter ego” or “soul” of the corporation; and 2) “more participation in 
corporate governance by workers, communities, consumers, and 
shareholders.”169   
 
163. See Larry E. Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 165, 198 (2006) (presenting 
anticapitalist views of Wall Street when Oliver Stone’s fictional character Gordon Gekko says, “[t]he 
richest one percent of this country owns half our country’s wealth;” “I create nothing; I own;” and 
“you’re not naïve enough to think we’re living in a democracy are you, Buddy?  It’s the free market.”)  
164. Edward, Lord Thurlow 1731–1806, supra note 162. 
165. Northwestern Nat Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906) (holding corporations are, 
for legal purposes, “persons”).  
166. Kent Greenfield, If Corporations Are People, They Should Act Like It, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/if-corporations-are-people-they-should-act-
like-it/385034/ [https://perma.cc/TXB9-PNDY]. 
167. Kent Greenwood & Daniel A. Rubens, Corporate Personhood and the Putative First Amendment 
Right to Discriminate, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES, Research Paper No. 560 at 1, 
7 (2021) (suggesting such “separateness” means that shareholders are not held liable for corporate 
debts).  
168. “Corporate personhood” realizes an idea in which the corporation has a legal identity 
distinct from its shareholders.  Id. 
169. Id. (“The cure for this is more democracy within businesses—more participation in 
corporate governance by workers, communities, shareholders, and consumers.  If corporations were 
more democratic, their participation in the nation’s political debate would be of little concern.”); 
see Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation 
37 CORNELL L. FAC. PUBL’N 621, 638 (asserting “meaningful public participation in the process of 
regulating systemic risk associated with financial innovation” is needed to avoid continuing to “relying 
on bankers and bureaucrats as the only viable guardians of the common good.”). 
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Hence, one thing we can take away from the film’s depiction of Dick Fuld 
as the supposed “villain” is that while flawed, he is likely not the real 
monster.  In order to conceptualize this idea, take the famed horror film, 
Frankenstein.170  The film, based on a stage adaptation of author Mary 
Shelley’s 1818 novel Frankenstein: or The Modern Prometheus, sees 
Dr. Frankenstein, in his attempt to play God and creator, pieces together a 
being from corpses and gives it life.171  He succeeds in his morbid 
experimentation, giving life to his own creature (often called the 
Frankenstein monster, or simply “Frankenstein”), who later turns against 
him.172  Indeed, Dr. Frankenstein later regrets playing God through his 
creation, as he inadvertently endangers his own life and the lives of his 
family, friends, and community when the creature seeks revenge against 
him.173  In this sense, we, the American public, did the same by creating the 
corporation as a legal person in our unorthodox scientific experiment.   
Recently, criticism of corporations center on the idea that corporate greed 
is “destroying the moral fabric of America[,]”174 and further, that corporate 
entities are pathological on account of their pursuit of profit and power, 
whatever the environmental or social cost.175  In the influential 
documentaries—The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power and 
The New Corporation: The Unfortunately Necessary Sequel—the organizational 
behavior of a typical profit-oriented multinational corporation is compared 
to the profile of a sociopath.176  The behavioral resemblances appear to be 
troubling—“[s]elf-interested, manipulative, avowedly asocial, self-
aggrandising, unable to accept responsibility for its own actions or feel 
 
170. FRANKENSTEIN (Universal Pictures 1931).  




174. TRANSCRIPT: Bernie Sanders meets with the Daily News Editorial Board, April 1, 2016, 
Daily News (Apr. 4, 2016, 4:17 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/transcript-bernie-
sanders-meets-news-editorial-board-article-1.2588306 [https://perma.cc/QB7B-8YUP]. 
175. See generally Steve Denning, What’s Wrong With Big Business?, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2016, 
1:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2016/04/11/is-big-business-destroying-the-
fabric-of-america/?sh=50f0f9005d22 [https://perma.cc/6ZYB-FZNF] (describing the widespread 
criticism of corporate entities from a variety of individuals and institutions). 
176. See The New Corporation, NEW CORPORATION, https://thenewcorporation.movie/ 
[https://perma.cc/G3VX-FJUR] (“The Corporation (2003) examined an institution within society and 
diagnosed it as psychopath.  With The New Corporation co-directors Joel Bakan and Jennifer Abbott 
are back with their lightning-rod of a sequel that reveals a world now fully remade in the corporation’s 
image, perilously close to losing democracy.”). 
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remorse—as a person, the corporation would probably qualify as a full-
blown psychopath.”177  My point here is that Dick Fuld could be rightfully 
vilified as a sociopath leading a corporation as portrayed in the documentary, 
but our current legal system is constructed on the principle that a 
corporation is a fictitious person with sociopathic behavioral traits.  As such, 
the film clearly demonstrates the dangers of limited liability within the 
corporate form.  It illustrates the negative consequences of no personal 
accountability for corporate individuals and offers the reflection that if souls 
are not damned—and bodies not kicked—more global financial crises will 
occur.  Inside Lehman Brothers shows that “Wall Street megabanks aren’t just 
too big to fail, they’re increasingly too big to jail.”178  In Lehman’s case, it 
failed, went bankrupt, and caused a nuclear cataclysm with its sudden and 
unexpected fall.  Why then didn’t any Wall Street people go to jail after the 
financial crisis?179   
Inside Lehman Brothers shows that the character and integrity of people 
have a direct influence on the organizational behavior (psychological 
processes and structures) and corporate culture of the company.  Effective 
corporate governance relies on effective ethical codes that must be 
communicated in organizations and assimilated into their cultures.180  
Moreover, effective corporate governance first and foremost relies on 
people leading the corporation.  The managerial tone set at the top of the 
corporate entity is not theoretical, it is real and applicable to all aspects of 
business ethics for organizations.  As such, the moral competencies of 
 
177. Simon Caulkin, Portrait of a Corporate Psychopath, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2004), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/oct/24/politics.money [https://perma.cc/FH7R-3U 
NN]. 
178. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 
81 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1379 (2013). 
179. See id. at 1446 (“Wall Street’s political machine has thus far succeeded in watering down 
Dodd-Frank’s statutory language and in undermining the implementation of those provisions that 
survived the legislative gauntlet.”). 
180. See Betsey Stevens & Scott Buechler, An Analysis of the Lehman Brothers Code of Ethics and the 
Role It Played in the Firm, 10 J. OF LEADERSHIP, ACCOUNTABILITY & ETHICS 43, 43 (2013) (“Corporate 
ethical codes are documents designed for internal and external audiences which state the major 
philosophical values embraced by an organization.  Effective codes define the responsibilities of the 
organization to stakeholders, outline expected conduct for employees and set the ethical parameters of 
the organization by articulating what is acceptable and what is not . . .  They have the ability to 
transform organizational cultures and function best when communicated effectively and culturally 
embedded in the organization; otherwise they remain as separate documents that are often seen as 
external to the company’s mission and purpose.”). 
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corporate leaders are essential.181  Research in the field of corporate 
governance explains that “[m]arket realities, including accepted business 
models, cognitive limitations, and heuristics, as well as personality traits of 
corporate actors, all combine to create a corporate culture[ ]” and influence 
market conditions.182  Again, it is possible to say that “[t]his corporate 
culture is an important institutional influence on corporate behavior—an 
influence distinct and perhaps more important than the influence of 
government standards, policies, and actions.”183  The documentary thus 
shows that personality traits of powerful CEOs, like Dick Fuld, trigger 
emotional responses that affect not only the corporate culture, but also, 
influence responses to Wall Street market conditions.   
With all this said, does our response to the question change?  Is Dick Fuld 
the villain and is Wall Street simply full of bad people who are greedy and 
acting out of vanity?  Perhaps, but this would appear to be an 
oversimplification of Inside Lehman Brothers and the reality on Wall Street, as 
exposed in the book Why They do It by Professor Soltes.184  Soltes suggests 
“[t]hrough numerous laboratory experiments, researchers [in the fields of 
psychology and behavioral ethics] have demonstrated that individuals [in the 
American financial industry] are more likely to engage in dishonest acts than 
they themselves believe (i.e.[,] people believe that they are more honest than 
they turn out to be in practice).”185  As a result, “[t]he considerable amount 
of misconduct that arises but goes largely unsanctioned by public agencies 
raises the question of the most effective regulatory and enforcement strategy 
to reduce corporate malfeasance.”186  Dick Fuld and his partners in crime 
might be some of the villains in the story, but the federal regulators are also 
equally responsible for the Lehman Brothers scandal.  In this sense, the 
problem does not only exist in the private sector but also in the public 
 
181. See Sunnie Giles, The Most Important Leadership Competencies, According to Leaders Around the 
World, HBR (Mar. 15, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/03/the-most-important-leadership-competencies-
according-to-leaders-around-the-world [https://perma.cc/W9Q9-JMSH] (describing a study in which 
67% of respondents voted high ethical and moral standards as a necessary leadership competency).  
182. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Corporate Wrongdoing: Interactions of Legal Mandates and Corporate Culture, 
36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 207, 238 (2016). 
183. Id. at 238–39. 
184. Eugene Soltes, a professor at Harvard Business School, was one of my main subject matter 
experts for my first film Collared.  He also acted as one of my main subject matter experts for the online 
accredited CLE course I researched and developed based on the film Inside Lehman Brothers.  
185. Eugene Soltes, The Frequency of Corporate Misconduct: Public Enforcement Versus Private Reality, 
26 J. FIN. CRIME 923, 930 (2019).  
186. Id. at 932. 
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sector.  As such, the documentary shows: first, we need profound legislative 
corporate law reforms on the legal status of corporations with more 
personal liability for the officials and the “directing mind” of the 
corporation—a.k.a. the “soul” of the organization; and second, more 
independence, prosecutorial power, and courage from federal regulators to 
go after and jail the souls of the corporation for their wrongdoings.187  If 
regulators really intend to tackle this legal problem, they have the power to 
do so by making their proposed laws clear and concise to all citizens and by 
closing all loopholes. 
V.    CHIEF LOOPHOLE OFFICER OR CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER: 
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN LEHMAN’S WITH REPO 105?  
We were pushing hard on legal questions and on accounting questions, to do 
things that to most reasonable people would seem illegal, but we would find 
a way to tell ourselves it was legal.  But as time went on, I kept having these 
sort of troubling moments of wait a second.  Is that really what I think it is?  
Are we really doing what that looks like we’re doing and I started raising 
questions.  One of my bosses just told me Look, these guys are here to just to 
make money.  Not being a Boy Scout, stop thinking.  They want to save the 
world.  They want to treat everybody with respect.  No, they’re here to make 
money.188  
—Oliver Budde, former associate general counsel at Lehman Brothers  
The failure of Lehman Brothers and the financial crisis that followed 
raised questions of the adequacy of the accounting practices used by 
investment banking institutions to account for their mortgage transactions 
which made their financial statements appear better than they actually were.  
For example, something referred to as “Repo 105” transactions were 
increasingly employed by Lehman in 2007 and 2008.189  The audit, led by 
Anton Valukas, revealed Lehman Brothers’ use of this legal and accounting 
loophole.190  This loophole allowed Lehman Brothers to hide its financial 
 
187. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39.  
188. Id. 
189. Agatha E. Jeffers, How Lehman Brothers Used Repo 105 to Manipulate Their Financial Statements, 
9 J. OF LEADERSHIP, ACCOUNTABILITY & ETHICS 44, 45 (2011). 
190. Chun-Chia (Amy) Chang et al., A Loophole in Financial Accounting: A Detailed Analysis of Repo 
105, 27 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 33, 33 (2011); see id. at 44 (“Soon after it demise, the news of Lehman’s 
use of Repo 105 came to light.”). 
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liabilities before filing a quarterly report with the SEC.191  “U.S. auditing 
standards require that auditors demand expert legal evidence in relation to 
complex structures that claim to place assets beyond the control of the 
company.”192  Thus, a “Repo 105 true sale accounting was not, therefore, 
possible without a legal opinion which stated that under English law the 
Repo 105s involved a true sale of the assets.”193  When giving their opinion, 
“lawyers are expected to exhibit ‘judge-like’ qualities of independence and 
neutrality.”194  Therefore, in corporate governance a lawyer’s “legal opinion 
has a function beyond informing the client about the applicable law.”195   
A legal opinion provides for the client or a third party—for example, as in the 
case of Repo 105s, an auditor—external and independent verification of a 
legal position.  Without it the client or the third party would not be able to act 
—to sign off on an accounting treatment or to rate a security.  An opinion is 
more tangible, concrete and, for the capital markets, more meaningful than 
the mere provision of written or oral advice.196  
Also, if the legal opinion was the product of a reputable and respected law 
firm, it would have more weight.197   
Inside Lehman Brothers shows that lawyers, to a large extent, were also the 
cause of this scandal.198  The Hollywood proverb, “[w]ith great power 
 
191. See id. (“The questionable accounting technique, known as Repo 105, allowed Lehman 
Brothers to temporarily appear healthier in the eyes of its investors, creditors, and other interested 
parties.”); Chun-Chia (Amy) Chang et al., supra note 190, at 33.  (“By reporting repos as sales of assets, 
Lehman was able to remove these toxic assets (e.g., subprime mortgage loans) from its books and use 
the cash received to reduce its liabilities.”).  
192.  David Kershaw & Richard Moorhead, Consequential Responsibility for Client Wrongs: Lehman 
Brothers and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 76 MOD. L. REV. 26, 40 (2013) (footnote omitted). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. (footnote omitted). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. (footnote omitted). 
197. See id. (footnote omitted) (“As the law firm as a whole signs and stands behind it, the 
opinion is viewed as being more independent and, therefore, more reliable than the mere provision of 
advice by a single partner.”). 
198. See id. at 27 (“Clearly lawyers did not cause the collapse of Lehman, but Linklaters, a 
London headquartered corporate law firm, provided advice and a legal opinion which was an important 
component in enabling Lehman to implement suspect accounting practices.”).  “The high-profile 
failure of Lehman Brothers provides a unique opportunity to explore these questions in the context of 
the provision of a legal opinion by a magic circle law firm—a legal opinion which, although as a matter 
of law was accurate, was a necessary precursor to an accounting treatment by Lehman Brothers which 
was described by the Lehman’s Bankruptcy Examiner as ‘balance sheet manipulation’.”  Id. at 26. 
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comes great responsibility”—popularized by the film Spider-Man199—
captures this notion.  In today’s highly interconnected world, individuals 
have both more responsibility and agency.  Yet, at the same time, individuals 
often rely on the acts and omissions of others.  Inside Lehman Brothers 
demonstrates how corporate lawyers seemingly overlooked this 
responsibility when they failed to foresee or act on critical correlations that 
might have prevented, or at least mitigated, the crisis.200  In other words, 
lawyers, Wall Street employees, and financial giants alike appear to believe 
this simple, yet wise adage, does not apply to them.   
The Forbes article, It’s OK to Hate Lawyers, suggests “[p]eople hate lawyers 
because they represent the interests of people and corporations without 
really caring who they are, what they did, what harm they caused, or, how 
culpable they are.”201  The hate for lawyers appears to relate back a long-
lasting question in legal ethics: is it the ethical obligation of a transactional 
lawyer to act as the gatekeeper of integrity or to act on behalf of his client?  
Here, I think it is important to remind our readership that corporate lawyers 
are not agents of the government working for the public interest and 
welfare.202  It is a bit simplistic to say that, but one must understand and 
appreciate the lawyer-entrepreneur model.  If the lawyer is to survive and 
thrive in the legal industry, a client-centric orientation and a natural 
allegiance to the client is required.  Simply put, whoever pays the lawyer’s 
bills will have a large impact on their ethical orientation.  Especially today, 
as competition is strong.  If one corporate lawyer is not willing to give a 
compliant legal opinion that lacks ethics but can be justified by a technical 
loophole, another may be willing to do so.  
Clients hire, pay, and supervise their lawyers.  Therefore, the lawyer–client 
relationship is essentially based on a transaction where the corporate lawyer 
is not the master, but too often the puppet.  This transactional relationship 
is an important obstacle to the professional, ethical independence required 
for a corporate lawyer to play the role of gatekeeper.  It is necessary to know 
who will pay his fees and supervise him to determine the feasibility of him 
acting as a gatekeeper.  The natural allegiances of the lawyer–client 
relationship create a structural conflict for the in-house lawyer who must 
 
199. SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002). 
200. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
201. Victoria Pynchon, It’s OK to Hate Lawyers, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2013, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shenegotiates/2013/01/18/its-ok-to-hate-lawyers/?sh=3f5e15b256 
94 [https://perma.cc/LK6H-XG65]. 
202. See id. (“We’re not a public service . . . .”).  
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serve the interests of the corporation, as embodied by the interests of the 
shareholders.203  One may presume the purpose of the corporate lawyer’s 
legal advice is too often the short-term maximization of profit at any cost.  
As a result, corporate lawyers can be compared to loaded guns.  
To avoid this analogy, one may promote a “virtue ethics approach to 
moral dilemmas,”204 but this approach is not practical.  Lawyers are not 
employees of the government or the public, but rather of regular folks who 
also need to pay their bills.  As such, the role of the lawyer-entrepreneur 
must be considered in legal ethics.205  Even physicians, with their renowned 
Hippocratic Oath,206 appear to be facing the same problem.  They 
“oftentimes face intractable situations of dual loyalties and competing 
obligations.”207  The physician-entrepreneur model is also important to 
consider and appreciate when we talk about ethics for physicians.208  As 
soon as money is intertwined with an ethical obligation for a professional, 
there will be ethical tensions and problems with his deontological 
obligations.  For example, should we let a physician who prescribed bad 
 
203. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, . . . give substance 
to the lawyer’s gatekeeper role primarily through two rules.  The first is Model Rule 1.13, which 
identifies the “client” in the representation of an organization, including corporations. . . .  The second 
rule defining a lawyer’s role as gatekeeper is Model Rule 1.2(d), which restricts lawyers from knowingly 
assisting their clients in certain wrongful conduct.  Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, 
The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 15–16 (2003) 
(footnotes omitted). 
204. P. Gardiner, A Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Dilemmas in Medicine, 29 J. OF MEDICAL 
ETHICS 297, 297 (2003) (“Virtue ethics is a framework that focuses on the character of the moral agent 
rather than the rightness of an action.”).  
205. Cf. Roiphe, supra note 23, at 653 (tracing how professionalism—which previously required 
lawyers to suppress their own self-interest in order to ascertain and pursue the public good—became 
synonymous with delivery of services in the 1970s). 
206. See June M. McKoy et al., Is Ethics for Sale? . . . Juggling Law and Ethics in Managed Care, 
8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 559, 560 (2005) (“The advent of managed care is commonly portrayed 
as improperly supplanting the principle that physicians consider the interests of individual patients 
above all else to a perfectly functional and consistent 2,000 year-old Hippocratic ethic.”). 
207. Id.  Money and medicine are indivisible and often irreconcilable.  See Eli Y. Adashi, Money 
and Medicine: Indivisible and Irreconcilable, 17 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 780, 781 (2015) (asserting that 
medicine and money become further entangled when the role of the physician-entrepreneur is 
considered). 
208. [T]here is a substantial overlap between the elements of professional formation in the legal 
and medical profession: (1) internalization of deep responsibility to the person served; 
(2) a commitment to excellence at the competencies needed to serve well; (3) moral reasoning; 
(4) understanding of interpersonal relationships; (4) adherence to ethical codes; (5) integrity; and 
(6) responsibility to the community and public good.  Neil Hamilton & Sarah Schaefer, What Legal 
Education Can Learn from Medical Education About Competency-Based Learning Outcomes Including Those Related 
to Professional Formation and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 399, 433 (2016). 
  
42 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 12:2 
drugs to his patient which caused the patient’s death to continue to practice?  
We certainly hope not.  Similarly, regarding bar associations as regulatory 
bodies, should we allow a corporate attorney, like Lehman’s, who caused 
great harm to a society, the ability to continue to practice?209  Again, we 
hope not.  Of course, in a perfect world, legal and accounting opinions 
would be ethical and provide cautions of their consequences.  However, 
lawyers and accountants are not gatekeepers, nor should they be expected 
to be.  Instead, they are “encouraged to exploit every loophole in the rules, 
take advantage of every one of their opponents’ tactical mistakes or 
oversights, and stretch every legal or factual interpretation to favor their 
clients.”210  Consider this: when you visit your tax advisor or accountant, 
do you ask him or her, “Please make sure that I pay the maximum amount 
of taxes for the benefit of my society and community?”  Or do you say, 
“Please make sure I get all my tax breaks and benefits in accordance with 
the law?”211  My point here is that a lawyer is usually not the bad guy or, to 
take the words of Holmes, not the “Bad Man.”212  Instead, I argue, as 
Holmes did in The Path of the Law, that too often lawyers operate in a world 
where their clients care little for ethics or lofty conceptions of natural law 
and instead care simply about a narrow conception of the law that will allow 
 
209. The legal opinion provided to Lehman allowed for its bankruptcy and death.  See Kershaw 
& Moorhead, supra note 192, at 27 (describing how Lehman’s executives sought a particular legal 
opinion which furthered a predetermined course of action). 
210. Christine Parker, A Critical Morality for Lawyers: Four Approaches to Lawyers’ Ethics, 
30 MONASH U. L. REV. 49, 60 (2004) (quoting Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (1988)).  This is ethically justified because as long as the lawyers for all parties in any 
action or matter act adversarially in the narrow interests of their own client, it is said that the legal 
system will make sure the right outcome ensues.  Indeed, the adversarial advocate believes that for 
lawyers to act otherwise—that is, to judge potential clients before they have had their day in court—
would be a presumptuous denial of justice to anyone who wants to use the legal system.  Id.   
211. The manufactur[ing] of factual indeterminacy in furtherance of tax avoidance activity 
constitutes potentially unethical attorney conduct.  The structuring of facts toward tax avoidance is not 
merely the rendering of legal advice as contemplated by the Model Code of Professional Conduct, and 
instead may assist the Holmesian “bad man” client toward conduct that is normatively prohibited under 
tax laws.  Bret N. Bogenschneider, Professional Ethics for the Tax Lawyer to the Holmesian “Bad Man”, 
49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 775, 775 (2016). 
212. See David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s The Path 
of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1574 (1997) (criticizing Holmes’s theory for neglecting to mention 
the lawyer-client relationship is not limited to advice but includes advocacy); see also Marco Jimenez, 
Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069, 2113–14 (2011) (footnotes omitted) 
(asserting Holmes’s “bad man cannot be influenced by morality, he is by nature a rational animal, and 
can be influenced by the threat of sanctions.”).  “The bad man, in short, is the calculating man[,]” and 
can be influenced by the legal, financial, and reputational consequences of a legal risk.  Id. 
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them to stay out of jail and avoid costly damages.213  So why then would a 
lawyer, who is an agent for their client, care about ethics?  Mathew Lee, a 
former Lehman senior vice president who enjoyed a rich income and 
prominent status in the financial world, explains this notion in the 
documentary, stating:  
How do you make as much money as possible by getting where no one’s gone 
before.  And you have to dream up legal ways of making a lot of money.  That 
to a lot of people who have ethical moral standards may seem quite illegal.  
But if there’s no law, it’s not illegal.  So do it because you’re gonna make some 
money.  Investment banks operate in that fashion.214 
As a reflection on the Inside Lehman Brothers film, I propose three creative 
solutions to ensure that Chief Legal Officers (CLO) become gatekeepers of 
integrity in corporations instead of the Chief Loophole Officers.  First, 
government lawmakers must be responsible if they create loopholes because 
it is possible to prevent loopholes with strict liability.215  For instance, the 
U.K. Bribery Act’s (UKBA) “Failure of commercial organisations to prevent 
bribery” is the best known example of this concept and provides a potential 
solution.216  Prior to 2010, United Kingdom (UK) bribery laws were 
considered inadequate with regards to combatting corporate commercial 
bribery.217  This was evidenced in the UK’s failure to prosecute a single 
 
213. See Symposium, The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 700 (1998) (“You can see very 
plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the 
public force, and therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality 
and law.”); see also Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 554–55 (1994) (emphasizing the falsehood held by lawyers that they are 
“independent” from their clients in that they are not morally responsible for their clients’ actions). 
214. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
215. “[S]trict liability is liability without wrongdoing.  A defendant subject to strict liability must pay 
damages irrespective of whether she has met, or failed to meet, an applicable standard of conduct.  
Action that causes harm is all that is required.”  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict 
Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 745 (2016).  
216. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.) (providing guidance on what constitutes bribery and 
associated affirmative defenses therein under the laws of the United Kingdom); see David Kirk, 
Criminalising Bad Bankers, 76 J. CRIM. L. 439, 440–441 (2012) (arguing in favor of a form of strict liability 
offense similar to “s. 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 and the Money Laundering Regulations 2007,” to hold 
criminal bankers accountable).  
217. Anneka Randhawa & Lucy Rogers, Reflections on the UK Bribery Act (Part I), WHITE & CASE 
(June 14, 2021), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/reflections-uk-bribery-act-part-i 
[https://perma.cc/VWP2-DUUM]; see What Is The Bribery Act 2010?, DELTANET, https://www.delta-
net.com/compliance/anti-bribery-corruption/faqs/what-is-the-bribery-act-2010 [https://perma.cc/ 
V772-RATT] (“The Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 was regarded by the Secretary of State for 
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case of bribery against a company.218  “However, the UKBA’s section 7 
offense circumvented this issue by criminalising the failure of commercial 
organizations to prevent bribery by associated persons.”219  Thus, the 
question then becomes, whether United States corporate governance law 
should consider risk-taking that could systemically harm the public under 
the strict liability of “Failure to Prevent” like in the UKBA.220  On one 
hand, “corporate risk-taking is certainly economically necessary and often 
desirable.”221  However, my opinion is that, drawing from the UKBA, we 
should introduce a strict liability corporate offence for failing to prevent 
risk-taking decisions that could systemically harm the public “by persons 
associated with relevant commercial organisations (the Failure to Prevent 
Offence).”222 
The UK Ministry of Justice Guidance (UKBA Guidance), issued in 
March 2011, lays out six principles intended to inform a commercial 
organization’s approach for establishing adequate procedures.223  Focusing 
on active and effective procedures, rather than paper policies, I have revised 
these six principles to make them applicable to Lehman’s story, and added 
the “Failure to Prevent Offence” provision to combat excessive risk-taking 
on Wall Street that could cause harm to the public:  
 
Justice in 2009, as old and anachronistic.  Therefore, it was widely agreed that a new legislative force 
was needed.”). 
218. See Randhawa & Rogers, supra note 217 (“Historically, UK prosecutors have struggled to 
secure convictions against corporations and this has been attributed in large part to the requirement to 
prove wrongdoing by the directing mind and will of a company under the traditional ‘identification 
principle[.]’). 
219. Id.  The Act stipulates that failure to prevent bribery is a strict liability offense applicable 
only to relevant commercial organizations, i.e., corporate directors and officers such as board members, 
CEOs, COOs, CFOs and CLOs.  “[A] bribe paid anywhere in the world by a commercial organization’s 
‘associated person’ with the intention of benefiting the organization (even without its knowledge) will 
cause the organization to commit an offence, and the only defense is that it had in place ‘adequate 
procedures’ to prevent bribery.”  Summary of the UK Bribery Act 2010, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT 
(May 2020), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge/publications/b0080606/ 
summary-of-the-uk-bribery-act-2010-may-2020 [https://perma.cc/HBQ7-49CS]. 
220. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.). 
221. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 23 (2016) (quoting Gabriel Jimenez et al., How Does Competition Impact Bank 
Risk-Taking? (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. Working Paper Series No. 2007-23, 2007), 
http://www.frbsf.org/eco-nomic-research/publications/working-papers/2007/wp7-23bk.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L4SZ-6SA4]).  
222. Summary of the UK Bribery Act 2010, supra note 219. 
223. Lawrence J. Trautman & Joanna Kimbell, Bribery and Corruption: The COSO Framework, 
FCPA, and U.K. Bribery Act, 30 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 218 (2018). 
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1. Implementing a smart, corporate compliance management 
framework with proportionate risk procedures:  The goal here, in 
practice, is to build a smart, corporate compliance management 
framework that is not too cumbersome or red-taped.  What is needed 
is a practical framework that considers the importance of realizing 
that in business practice, risk is not solely about threats but also about 
opportunities.  The risk management framework must encourage 
decision-making oriented towards smart risks that make sense and do 
not have unacceptable ethical and reputational consequences for 
shareholders and the public/stakeholders; 
2. Securing top-level commitment for an ethical tone-at-the-top: 
Any corporate compliance management framework promoting ethics 
in business relies on individuals and their ethical leadership.  Senior 
managers must, therefore, be personally involved and dedicated to 
promoting a culture of integrity.  This means that an ethics 
management culture combines a concern for the law with an 
emphasis on managerial responsibility for ethical behavior.  This 
approach allows lawyers to consider the ethical and reputational 
consequences of their legal advice rather than focusing on finding 
technical loopholes.  For example, in practice, this means not doing 
what the Lehman Brothers did, and avoiding using technical 
loopholes such as Repo 105; 
3. Conducting a meaningful risk assessment: Corporate lawyers and 
other experts, such as accountants, need to assess the risks not only 
from a technical dimension with their legal or accounting expertise, 
but also for the practical consequences.  They must consider the 
corporate, financial, and ethical consequences for shareholders and 
the reputational consequences of the legal or accounting risk for 
making a specific decision, such as using Repo 105.  This will help 
foster more reasonable risk-taking decisions that take into account a 
sustainable perspective and not just a short-term, profit-maximizing 
view that can lead to bankruptcy and harm to employees, investors, 
and the general public;  
4. Conducting due diligence for both shareholders and 
stakeholders: Ensuring procedures are in place to monitor for 
potential risks to shareholders, risks for stakeholders, risk to 
employees, and risks to agents and third parties; 
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5. Fostering stakeholder-centric communication and investor 
engagement: Ensuring the compliance framework, including the 
code of ethics and organizational policies for managing the risks of 
corporate corruption, are well communicated both internally and 
externally.  Good communication means committing to your ethical 
obligations.  Put differently, a person who always says he or she wants 
to be honest but consistently acts dishonestly will lose all credibility.  
This communicative engagement means you must walk what you talk.  
Investors are involved because they are directly affected by the 
decisions the corporation makes, and they can influence the 
implementation of its decisions.  Conversely, stakeholders (e.g., 
government, taxpayers, and employees) are also directly affected by 
the company’s decisions and can influence their implementation.  
Thus, communication is as essential to investors as it is to 
stakeholders; and 
6. Performing continuous monitoring and reviewing the smart 
corporate compliance management framework: Nothing is static.  
It is an iterative process that requires constant improvement and 
long-term commitment.  You must be willing to revise and improve.  
It is not only a technical commitment to revise your bureaucratic 
procedures, but also a moral commitment to want to do better, to 
improve.  This is the basis of ethical leadership. 
I argue that a new provision of the “Failure to Prevent Offence,” based 
on the UKBA, should be created in federal corporate laws to combat the 
type of excessive risk-taking on Wall Street that harms the public, such as in 
the Lehman case.  Admittedly, such thinking might be idealistic, but the 
global COVID-19 pandemic has emphasized the importance of our national 
security interests and collective welfare.  Therefore, such law is a necessary 
enforcement action designed to protect our national security interests and 
welfare against globally catastrophic events, such as Lehman’s bankruptcy 
which led to a global financial crisis.224 
A second creative solution to mitigate the risk of CLOs becoming Chief 
Loophole Officers is to require banks and financial institutions to have 
 
224. Lehman Brothers had a sham paper corporate compliance program only used for 
concealing or deflecting liability.  See Stevens & Buechler, supra note 183, at 43 (“The study revealed 
that the culture at Lehman was not tied to the code and it did not play a significant role in the 
organization”).   
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independent audit committees selecting, compensating, and supervising the 
CLO and in-house corporate lawyers.225  In this regard, an emphasis must 
be put upon diligently selecting the corporate lawyers based upon their 
moral compass and ethical leadership abilities.  These committees are an 
excellent alternative to better defend and represent the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders because they are independent of the 
corporation.  This requirement could be met by the companies themselves 
through a change in their corporate governance structure, but would likely 
only be incorporated through federal regulatory action.  It could also be 
enforced through sanctions, or even better, through incentives such as tax 
credits, because, ultimately, it is always the taxpayers who must bail out Wall 
Street.226 
Third, superior professional regulations should be enforced to rebuild the 
public’s trust in lawyering and the essential role of lawyers in our society.227  
Bar associations across the world need to better regulate the “grey areas,” as 
law is defined as neither black nor white but as a shade of grey.  Additionally, 
new professional regulations need to be imposed to ensure lawyers are 
mindful of these grey ethical areas when defending their client’s interests.  
Legal opinions, such as Repo 105 in Lehman’s case, I argue, should be 
subject to disbarment for corporate lawyers who provide them.  This, in 
effect, would make it very difficult for a corporation to shop around and 
find a lawyer and/or law firm willing to leverage unethical loopholes that 
can cause harm to society.  
VI.    FILM’S LEGACY AND WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM 
LEHMAN’S BANKRUPTCY? 
Inside Lehman Brothers is the picture-perfect case study to discuss corporate 
compliance, corporate misconduct, whistleblowing, and ethical decision-
 
225. See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 203, at 70–71 (“[A]s a matter of corporate governance, 
lawyers for a corporation should be selected, compensated, and supervised by independent audit 
committees.”). 
226. See Matt Taibbi, Secrets and Lies of the Bailout, ROLLING STONES (Jan. 4, 2013, 9:25 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/secrets-and-lies-of-the-bailout-113270/ 
[https://perma.cc/PV8X-AS42] (suggesting the idea that the taxpayer was stepping in only temporarily 
to prop up the economy was a lie, and what we actually ended up doing was “committing American 
taxpayers to permanent, blind support of an ungovernable, unregulatable, hyperconcentrated new 
financial system that exacerbates the greed and inequality that caused the crash . . . . ”). 
227. See Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 203, at 55–56 (“What is needed is a standard that 
reaches both incompetent and evasive lawyers, and this requires an objective criterion rooted firmly in 
a reasonableness or negligence standard.”).  
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making in practice.  I start my analysis with an infamous quote from the 
former CEO of Lehman Brothers, Dick Fuld, that illustrates the 
pathological culture of Wall Street—a culture of privileged white men acting 
and behaving like frat boys: “I agree we need some help-but the [BROs] 
always wins!!”228  This statement is one of the most evocative of the toxic 
corporate culture at Lehman Brothers.  Of course, in 2008, we all could see 
how much “the BROs” won as they tasted bitter bankruptcy. 
In terms of corporate compliance, the film illustrates a toxic tone-at-the 
top229 and a lethal culture of machismo competition.  Research in the field 
of white-collar crime shows that a culture of ultra-competition is a greater 
predicator for the likelihood of committing corporate misconduct and crime 
than greed.230  In other words, vanity is often more dangerous than 
greed.231  In concrete, a culture of ultra-competition leads to excessive risk-
taking as illustrated in Lehman’s story—something that was all too prevalent 
on Wall Street leading up to the 2008 global financial crisis.  What we have 
learned from the documentary is that a corporate culture, similar to a drug, 
can be toxic, contagious, and addictive: 
[Y]ou are on your toes.  You’re watching your back.  You had to do the best.  
There was just a certain vibrancy all the time.  But I enjoyed that.  It’s difficult 
to describe an electric feeling but I’d never felt so intense all day, as I did at 
 
228. See La Roche, supra note 41 (quoting an email from Dick Fuld, former Lehman Brothers 
CEO, to David Goldfarb, former Chief Strategy officer for Lehman Brothers); see also Jake Zamansky, 
The Chickens Come Home to Roost for Standard & Poor’s, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2013, 6:39 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jakezamansky/2013/02/05/the-chickens-come-home-to-roost-for-
standard-poors-2/?sh=92f1890375fc [https://perma.cc/RVM5-JFEJ] (capturing the bitter reality of 
the situation when, in an email sent by a Standard & Poor’s employee prior to the financial crisis, the 
employee wrote, “[l]et’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of card[s] falters.”)  
229. See Fabiana Lacerca-Allen, Next-Level Compliance: What Every Board Member Should Know, 
10 INT’L IN-HOUSE COUNS. J., AUTUMN  1, 4 (2016) (explaining the crucial role leaders play in 
establishing the culture of compliance); ASS’N CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, TONE AT THE TOP: HOW 
MANAGEMENT CAN PREVENT FRAUD IN THE WORKPLACE 1, https://www.acfe.com/uploaded 
Files/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/tone-at-the-top-research.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKK9-
ATTQ] (“When those in top positions set the wrong, unethical example by committing fraud, their 
employees will take heed and follow in their bosses’ fraudulent footsteps, creating an entire culture of 
workplace fraud.”). 
230. See James William Coleman, Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 93 AM. J. 
SOCIO. 406, 417 (1987) (“Moreover, the key components of the culture of competition in motivating 
the white-collar criminal-the desire for wealth and success and the fear of failure-have, if anything, 
grown stronger in the 20th century.”). 
231. See id.  
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Lehman Brothers.  It sounds crazy, but actually was good.  Because it’s like a 
drug.  Another drug we were on.232 
The documentary goes on to show that the culture of “bros or frat boys” 
still prevails on Wall Street.  One source of this poisonous frat culture is the 
lack of diversity on Wall Street, as today, it is still predominantly run by 
white males who often come from privileged backgrounds.233  Therefore, 
the need for diversity in corporate boardrooms to dismantle the “bro 
culture” in Wall Street and corporate America is clear.234  Research shows 
that diversity improves ethical leadership in an organization.235  In this 
sense, a company must always think in terms of stakeholder engagement, 
because without public trust—especially for a company trading on the stock 
exchange—nothing can be sustainable and optimal for its operations.236  A 
company must think about all its stakeholders, including investors, 
employees, consumers, and regulators.  In the current context of deep social 
and racial divides in American society and around the world, it is crucial that 
companies think in terms of human rights and human dignity.  Based on my 
understanding of the documentary, I do not believe that Lehman Brothers 
took into consideration the human consequences of their actions even once. 
Diversity is also needed in the corporate structure.  Consider George 
Floyd’s murder in Minneapolis in 2020.  While there always seems to be some 
emphasis on anti-racism, Floyd’s murder ignited the “largest racial justice 
protests in the United States since the Civil Rights Movement.”237  And this 
 
232. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
233. Emma Graham, Wall Street is under pressure over its lack of diversity, CNBC (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/02/wall-street-is-under-pressure-over-its-lack-of-diversity.html 
[https://perma.cc/7ZWN-WZV7] (“Wall Street has long been an industry dominated by [w]hite males.  
At Goldman Sachs, just 2.7 percent of executives, senior officials and managers are Black. At Citi, 
2 percent of executives and senior managers are Black.”).  
234. Cf. Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and Ethics: Toward an Objective Business Compliance Function, 
49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 581, 595–601 (2018) (asserting that diversity is a strategic advantage for 
compliance and ethics).  
235. Id.  
236. See Neil Jeffrey, Stakeholder Engagement: A Road Map to Meaningful Engagement: #2 in the 
Doughty Centre ‘How to do Corporate Responsibility’ Series, DOUGHTY CENTRE, CRANFIELD SCHOOL OF 
MANAGEMENT, at 3 (July 2019), https://www.fundacionseres.org/lists/informes/attachments/1118 
/stakeholder%20engagement.pdf [https://perma.cc/GU4K-M4FM] (“An organisation cannot be 
serious about Corporate Responsibility unless it is serious about stakeholder engagement—and vice 
versa.”). 
237. Jason Silverstein, The global impact of George Floyd: How Black Lives Matter protests shaped 
movements around the world, CBS NEWS (June 4, 2021, 7:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
george-floyd-black-lives-matter-impact/ [https://perma.cc/8HSE-2R46]. 
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time, the movement appears to have gone far beyond simply protesting in 
the street—“[t]he outpouring of rage and empathy that followed shook the 
foundations of Corporate America in unprecedented ways[.]”238  In fact, 
“Floyd's murder changed Black Lives Matter from a controversial social 
justice undertaking to an almost ubiquitous corporate mantra seemingly 
overnight.  Fortune 1000 companies poured billions of dollars into 
programs designed to address systemic racism and committed to fulfilling 
quantifiable racial hiring quotas after decades of resisting them.”239  Thus, 
anti-racism has been accentuated by the murder of George Floyd and Black 
Lives Matter (BLM).  In line with this shift, a company must represent the 
demographics and cultural diversity of its customers, and of its country in 
general.  This allows the company to have a social conscience and to better 
understand the differences in socio-cultural and ethical sensitivities created 
by these segments of the population.  In short, it aids them in acting more 
ethically.  Diversity is something that must be managed actively, not 
passively, in order to reap the benefits.  For example, instead of it being a 
risk, diversity becomes a strategic advantage.  Further, cultural and racial 
diversity in senior management or in a board of directors allows room for 
differing opinions and options to optimize the performance of the company 
at both managerial and ethical levels.  For this reason, requiring a corporate 
diversity disclosure mandate on the businesses traded on the stock exchange 
is something that exists in many countries, such as Canada.240 
In terms of corporate misconduct, the film illustrates that there is virtually 
zero accountability, as Dick Fuld and Wall Street executives were never 
charged with anything whatsoever.241  Is our justice system incapable of 
 
238. Chauncey Alcorn, George Floyd’s death was a wake-up call for Corporate America. Here’s what has—
and hasn’t—changed, CNN BUSINESS (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/25/business/ 
corporate-america-anti-racism-spending/index.html [https://perma.cc/NS6N-RJ2Q]. 
239. Id.  
240. Jennifer Jeffrey et al., Canada is first jurisdiction worldwide to require diversity disclosure beyond gender; 
Diversity disclosure rules will apply to federally incorporated public companies effective Jan. 1, 2020 (Jul. 30, 2019), 
https://www.osler.com/en/resources/regulations/2019/canada-is-first-jurisdiction-worldwide-to-re 
quire-diversity-disclosure-beyond-gender-diversity-disc [https://perma.cc/LVC2-KX9W] (“Effective 
January 1, 2020, corporations governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) with publicly 
traded securities will be required to provide shareholders with information on the corporation’s policies 
and practices related to diversity on the board of directors and within senior management. . . .”).  
241. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39.  See Michael Winston, Why have no CEOs been 
punished for the financial crisis?, HILL (Dec. 8, 2016, 6:10 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/finance/309544-why-have-no-ceos-been-punished-for-the-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/ 
Q6LW-S3Q3] (“The biggest banks—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, Deutsche Bank and 
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pressing these cases to their rightful conclusion?  Or just unwilling?  No 
accountability is dangerous for the fabric of the American society and goes 
against all democratic principles founded on a rule of law society where no 
one should be above the law—not even Wall Streeters.  Thus, as a result of 
these failures to keep corporations accountable, the banks are unafraid, 
unpunished and unapologetic, and no longer hope for support of their 
corrupt behavior.  They expect it. 
Regarding whistleblowing in practice, the film illustrates that despite 
potential financial rewards, whistleblowing is extremely hard and taxing.  
The documentary shows that the consequences of whistleblowing in white-
collar crimes can be analogized to whistleblowing in blue-collar crime, 
meaning “snitches get stitches.”242  While whistleblowing laws are 
important, they do little to incentivize whistleblowers’ actions beyond the 
altruistic and ethical leadership motive that may be inherent in the beliefs of 
the whistleblowers.  Instead, the laws should adequately protect and 
compensate whistleblowers for the harms they face when they decide to 
blow the whistle.  
In terms of ethical decision-making in practice, the film illustrates that we 
need to look past Dick Fuld, the supposed villain, and instead introduce 
meaningful reforms of corporate law and governance.  Professional 
regulatory sanctions for lawyers and accountants who have been complicit 
in wrongdoing should also be implemented.  The documentary shows that 
corporations have been weaponized, and that legal and business 
professionals using this weapon need to be better regulated.  Oliver Budde 
said he never imagined that Lehman Brothers would take the world down 
the way it did.243  In response to this, my question becomes, if Lehman and 
other giants on Wall Street brought the world down, as claimed by Budde, 
who is more powerful today, states or corporations?244  The answer may 
 
recently, Wells Fargo—were accused of fraud and contributing to financial decline not seen since the 
great depression, but hold no accountability.”). 
242. See Meghan Casserly, When Snitches Get Stitches: Physical Violence As Workplace Retaliation On 
The Rise, FORBES (Sep 21, 2012 10:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2012/ 
09/21/when-snitches-get-stitches-physical-violence-as-workplace-retaliation-on-the-rise/?sh=79910f 
b31ffa [https://perma.cc/52TM-ERRY] (“A new report from the Ethics Resource Center shows that 
physical violence at work as retaliation against whistle blowing is on the rise. Since 2009, the percentage 
of people who’ve reported misconduct at work and were victims of physical harm jumped more than 
25%.”). 
243. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
244. See Milan Babic et al., Who Is More Powerful—States or Corporations?, CONVERSATION 
(July 10, 2018, 11:14 AM), https://theconversation.com/who-is-more-powerful-states-or-corporatio 
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not be as simple as one or the other, as we now live in an era where the 
interplay between state and corporate power shapes the reality of 
international relations more than ever.  Inside Lehman Brothers makes us 
realize that powerful corporations like Lehman Brothers can indeed take the 
world down the just as it did in 2008.  In this sense, the power of the state 
did not disappear with globalization, but it transformed.  “It now competes 
with corporations for influence and political power.”245  Thus, our world is 
more interconnected than ever, and the excesses of Wall Street have global 
consequences for humanity.246  
One area the documentary does not discuss is the small corporate 
oligarchy.  Today, our markets are dominated by a small corporate oligarchy.  
And, in addition to the abuses and excesses of a multinational financial giant 
during the financial crisis, the COVID-19 crisis has also created a climate of 
instability and caused many bankruptcies, which promote the hegemony of 
big business—especially Big Tech—and disadvantage small businesses.  
Prior to the pandemic, small businesses were considered the “backbone of 
the economy.”247  But despite providing the economy with an 
overwhelming number of benefits, small businesses do not recoup the same 
government support as large corporations.  Small businesses do not receive 
the same tax breaks that are provided for large corporations, they do not 
receive the same local and state incentives for things like production 
facilities, or research and development, nor are they equipped to navigate 
the convoluted area of law that is bankruptcy.  Conversely, as with Lehman 
Brothers, similar to the 2008 bailout packages which funneled hundreds of 
billions to Wall Street and padded executives already-cushy pay packages, 
the CARES act, intended to go to those small businesses in need, has 
disproportionately gone to the wealthiest corporations and individuals.  And 
further, large companies can navigate bankruptcy laws and courts better 
than small and medium-sized companies.248  Finally, the bankruptcy courts 
 
ns-99616 [https://perma.cc/V3RC-SZUS] (arguing “that globalisation has brought about a global 
structure in which state power is not the exclusive governing principle anymore”).  
245. Id. 
246. See Zales, supra note 46, at 168 (discussing the harm of Lehman’s fall and Wall Street excess 
on American and global stability).  
247. See Small Businesses Are the Backbone of the Economy, BETTER ACCOUNTING (Aug. 11, 2020), 
https://betteraccounting.com/small-businesses-are-the-backbone-of-the-economy/ [https://perma. 
cc/J92J-C69G] (“99 percent of all businesses in the United States are small businesses.”). 
248. See DAVID SKEEL, BANKRUPTCY AND THE CORONAVIRUS: PART II 3 (2020) (discussing 
the possible fallout of the COVID-19 crisis on small business and bankruptcy filings). 
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in the COVID-19 crisis are clogged and the long delays make it even more 
difficult for small businesses to recover.249   
Another topic the documentary failed to address is the role of anti-trust 
laws.  The pandemic gave way for Big Tech companies such as Amazon, 
Netflix, Facebook, and Google to grow even more gigantesque.  What will 
be the role of anti-trust legislation in light of the pandemic?  Anti-trust law 
enforcement seems a story of the past, as the anti-competition and unethical 
behaviors are increasingly concentrated not in the banking field but in the 
Big Tech field.  The most lucrative market is no longer about investing 
money in real estate and stocks but about our personal data.  This means 
that corporations use our daily life habits to better influence and control us.  
This is the basis for the development of artificial intelligence without which 
data cannot develop—we are now aiming for a data-driven economy.  So, 
the story of Lehman Brothers is a story both of our past and of our present, 
but we must think about the future and see how Amazon, Facebook or 
Google will be able to cause global crises as Lehman Brothers did.  This is 
something that we are aware of, but there is very little action.  The 
documentary discusses Lehman Brothers and the other Wall Street financial 
giants that came to cause a global financial crisis.250  I believe that we also 
need to keep an eye on Big Tech because they have the potential to create 
not only a financial crisis but also a socio-political crisis impacting all our 




249. See id. (“Bankruptcy filings also are likely to increase dramatically, as consumers and 
businesses seek either to restructure their debt or to turn over their assets to the court and leave their 
current obligations behind.”). 
250. INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 39. 
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VII.    EPILOGUE 
Inside Lehman Brothers, Jennifer Deschamps’ documentary, is an excellent 
case study for applied business and legal ethics learning.251  As a lawyer-
filmmaker, I have seen the educational and transformational power of this 
documentary in action.  We presented the CLE course I researched based 
on Inside Lehman Brothers at the Bank of Canada (equivalent to the Federal 
Reserve Bank which is the central banking system of the United States).  The 
film allowed for an advanced and passionate discussion on ethics and 
whistleblowing within their organization.  CLE programs such as Inside 
Lehman Brothers were available to members of the Canadian Bar Association 
(CBA), sister organization of the American Bar Association (ABA).252  
Inside Lehman Brothers is offered by Chartered Professional Accountants 
(CPA) Canada—one of the largest accounting organizations in North 
America with more than 220k members—to launch a series titled, The 
Importance of Ethics: UDocs Video Series.253  This docuseries features two of 
my films (Collared and The Ai Taxman) and Jennifer Dischamps’ Inside Lehman 
Brothers.  The objective is to offer a fresh perspective on the importance of 
ethics for business and accounting professionals founded on visual legal 
advocacy.  So far, the feedback has been excellent and confirms that 
storytelling based on a collection of short documentary films presented as 
engaging case studies based on real-life events is excellent for learning ethics.   
 
251. As a professor of ethics, I argue in favor of applied legal ethics as the practical application 
of moral considerations with respect to real-world legal solutions offered to clients.  I am a proponent 
of Dr. Gentile, who has researched and developed Giving Voice to Values (GVV).  GVV is an action-
oriented model, similar to a training program for professional athletes, which is why it appeals to me 
as a former college football athlete.  GVV helps to build our muscles for ethical leadership.  It relies 
on our skills, our mental strength, our dedication, and in general our practice as for sports.  See generally 
Mary C. Gentile, Giving Voice to Values: An Action-Oriented Approach to Values-Driven Leadership, 79 S.A.M. 
ADVANCED MGMT. J. 42, 43 (2014) (exploring how one approach to integrating ethics and leadership 
has been used in educational settings across the globe).  I had the pleasure of meeting Mary at an 
academic conference when she was a professor at Harvard.  For a video on her research in the field of 
ethics, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xqf1lj0Jdco.  See also Joshua P. Davis, Teaching 
Values—The Center for Applied Legal Ethics, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 593, 593 (2002) (reflecting on how to 
educate law students about ethics though applied legal ethics).  
252. Inside Lehman Brothers: A Case Study in Compliance, Corporate Misconduct, Whistleblowing and 
Ethical Decision Making is no longer available on this platform.  See UDocs: CBA at the Movies, 
CANADIAN BAR ASS’N, https://www.cba.org/Professional-Development/UDocs [https://perma.cc/ 
5UWT-8SNL]. 
253. The Importance of Ethics: UDocs Video Series, CPA, https://www.cpacanada.ca/en/career-
and-professional-development/webinars/leadership-management/business-ethics/importance-of-eth 
ics-udocs-videos [https://perma.cc/K3EF-9DDL].  
  
2021] Inside Lehman Brothers 55 
The research and development of the online course based on Inside 
Lehman Brothers has allowed me to develop a relationship with Oliver Budde, 
who came to speak to my students.  My objective is to make a short 
documentary on Oliver Budde to discuss his experience as an insider, 
whistleblower in the Wall Street financial world, and as a lawyer for 
whistleblowers like him. 
In academia, I had the opportunity to present Inside Lehman Brothers to 
students in the mandatory course on Corporate Governance and Ethics that 
I am teaching for the EMBA, MBA and JD-MBA programs at the University 
of Ottawa.  Oliver Budde’s presentation in my class was supposed to last 
one hour, but it lasted more than two because my students asked so many 
questions after watching the documentary.  They felt privileged to have an 
ethical lawyer and brave whistleblower share his lived experience with them.  
I received a lot of positive feedback.  Many of my students mentioned that 
their experience in my course was one of the most memorable for their 
program.  This is not only flattering, but also encouraging.  New research 
explains why students forget—and what an educator, such as myself, can do 
about it.254  Namely, research in the field of neuroscience has begun to 
suggest that the brain is actually designed to forget.255  Thus, this research 
demonstrates the importance of strategies for retaining knowledge and 
ensuring the sustainability of learning that makes information stick in our 
brains.256  The research concludes that the purpose of memory is primarily 
to make decisions and not to store information.  The evidence for this 
research is the existence of cognitive biases such as racial or gender bias as 
discussed at the beginning of this Article.  These cognitive biases are 
erroneous mental shortcuts that we use to facilitate our decision-making in 
this complex and often much too chaotic world.257  So, my approach is also 
a way to help them memorize, in order to apply in practice, the things they 
are going to learn on the basis of the documentary and its characters as “law 
as lived experience.”  
 
254. Youki Terada, Why Students Forget—and What You Can Do about It, EDUTOPIA 
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.edutopia.org/article/why-students-forget-and-what-you-can-do-about-
it [https://perma.cc/TA2U-PTVZ]. 
255. Id.  
256. See Blake A. Richards & Paul W. Frankland, The Persistence and Transience of Memory, 
94 NEURON 1071, 1071 (2017) (proposing that the interaction between two memory processes is 
responsible for the optimization of “memory-guided decision-making in changing and noisy 
environments”). 
257. See id. at 1080 (asserting the goal of memory is not just to store information accurately but 
to “optimize decision-making” in chaotic, quickly changing environments). 
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In conclusion, documentaries such Inside Lehman Brothers have the power 
to move things because they are keeping our real world on the camera and 
the focus on real problems at a time when we are increasingly feeling 
disconnected from the parts of our society on which we all depend. 
  
